TITANS OF NUCLEAR

Emily’s GE career (0:08)
0:08-9:29 (Emily discusses her start in GE and the important role her mentors played in growing her career.)

Q. This is where you grew up. Tell me about that.
A. Emily Martin grew up in Wilmington, North Carolina where she currently works as the Chief Commercial officer of GE Hitachi Nuclear Energy. While studying chemical engineering at university, Emily took part in GE’s co-op program. This enabled her to switch between working at GE for a semester and studying for a semester throughout her university degree. This not only gave Emily experience working in the factory startup process, but also enabled her to graduate debt-free. After graduating, Emily’s first job with GE was in their health care wing. She found herself missing the energy industry, and so was able to transfer back and eventually took a role in supply chain sourcing. Transitioning from the technical side to the sourcing side was difficult, but mentors helped Emily as she grew her career. A constant throughout her journey within GE is Emily’s motivation to continually learn. Emily finds she is most inspired when she is slightly uncomfortable, so she is always pushing for something a little more.

Emily’s continued journey in GE (9:30)
9:30-14:46 (Emily defines Lean manufacturing and her role in GE’s wind supply chain.)

Q. What is lean manufacturing?
A. Lean manufacturing is a description of the Toyota production system of manufacturing. A few years ago, Emily became the leader of a program to implement Lean manufacturing at GE. The purpose of Lean manufacturing is improving efficiency and saving cost.

One role Emily took on involved GE’s wind supply chain development. The goal was to work with existing companies to create a deal structure which would incentivise the expansion and building of new factories to support wind blade production for GE. Structuring these deals included attractive financial plans and providing companies with technical assistance.

Emily had transitioned to wind from the nuclear division of GE. She found that the wind sector had few rules or procedures in place regarding their supply chain, which was interesting for Emily as nuclear supply chains are well developed. Emily eventually left wind to return to GE’s nuclear wing.

Drawing from wind to lift up the nuclear culture (14:47)
14:47-24:13 (Emily explains how she drew from the differences between the wind and nuclear cultures to inspire change in GE’s nuclear division.)

Q. Where there specific things that you learned in wind that you wanted to bring back to nuclear?
A. Yes. Emily was first shocked by the cultural differences between wind and nuclear. She noted that nuclear was embedded in safety culture, meaning innovation and fast growth was hindered because conservative decisions spread throughout the industry. She returned to the nuclear division of GE after 10 years in wind when a prior mentor had recruited her to help develop a more robust nuclear supply chain. Emily found the first year back in nuclear to be frustrating due to the slow speed of movement brought on by the widespread safety culture. She wanted to draw from the progressive culture of the wind sector to lift up and inspire the nuclear division. Emily was later able to expand her role to include all manufacturing factories, enabling her to reach and influence a greater number of people to shift the heavy culture nuclear was facing. Progressive cultures in industry attract diverse staff, bringing strength to the business through an increased quality of ideas. This creates better solutions faster, something Emily felt the nuclear industry was missing. This outlook inspired the leadership teams within GE’s nuclear branch to take on the challenge of mixing teams and engaging in debates.

Changing GE’s nuclear culture with LEAD (24:14)
24:14-36:19 (Emily expands on the debates that occur in GE’s nuclear business and explains how these debates are causing a cultural change.)

Q. Tell me about some of the debates that have come from the diverse groups and about some of the things that are changing.
A. Debates center around product and strategic growth. Some things that GE has adopted that came out of the debates include decommissioning, pressurised water reactor services and engaging with the Department of Energy (DoE). Before the debates, GE did not take on these additional actions due to the risk involved. However, GE’s willingness to take on this risk is visible to the entire workforce, beginning a cultural change.

The risks discussed in decommissioning debates center around whether or not will create a financial incentive to shut down plants. On one hand, decommissioning could accelerate the path towards new nuclear build, including small modular reactors (SMRs) and microreactors. The existing fleet, however, must continue to remain in operation and not be shut down prematurely to ensure decarbonization goals are met.

In Emily’s current position as the Chief Commercial Officer, she focuses not only on sales and customer relationships, but also acts as a nuclear advocate. She engages in these constructive debates to push the nuclear industry to be more visible and to help GE to be leaders in the industry. To do this, she engages in the leadership debates, known as Listen, Engage, Align, Decide (LEAD) meetings. Beyond the previously mentioned debate topics, the leadership team also discusses who GE is as a company and a brand. The debates converge around a firm understanding that the leaders are true believers in a future for nuclear. This structured time for debates has resulted in a fundamental change to GE’s vision and willingness to be bold.

Approving new nuclear business strategies (36:20)
36:20-43:38 (Emily explains the relationship between GE’s nuclear business and the larger GE company. She also expands on the sales aspect of her position.)

Q. What is the relationship between GE Hitachi and the bigger GE company when you make strategic business decisions?
A. There is a certain amount of autonomy, but any decision that could affect the enterprise risk of the bigger GE must be approved. This includes decisions on decommissioning and working with the DoE. To get approval, Emily’s team develops recommendations based on enterprise risk management and presents this to the larger GE company. GE will conduct their own enterprise risk assessment before returning an answer to GE Hitachi. Leadership changes within GE have given each individual business branch more autonomy, empowering the nuclear arm to be more willing to take risks.

Beyond advocacy, debates and strategic business decisions, Emily also sells nuclear fuel, parts and services. There is an existing loose partnership between existing sale lines and new power plants, but due to the differences between the traditional market and the new plants, there is not much crossover. It is encouraging, however, that existing fleet customers are talking seriously about investing in new plant technology, which could accelerate innovation. Additionally, new designs, such as the BWRX300, can benefit from the existing, mature supply chains, reducing costs and increasing the speed of production.

Boldly advocating for nuclear power (43:38)
43:38-51:08 (Emily explains her nuclear advocacy strategy.)

Q. You mentioned advocacy and going out into the community. What are some of your efforts there and how do you become a voice for the nuclear industry?
A. Thus far, Emily has focused on speaking at events. This has included speaking at industry conferences, increasing the visibility of GE’s nuclear sector. Emily has also pushed to speak with people who are skeptical about nuclear power, hoping to eventually speak at a climate change conference. She notes that this strategy brings up tough questions, citing examples from when speaking at the Atomic Wings Panel at the DoE and the Nuclear Powers Pennsylvania Rally. Emily discusses the difficulty in remaining confident without resorting to defending nuclear safety when responding to tricky questions.

Emily’s advocacy strategy focuses around connecting the dots for people at the intersection of different technologies. Emily is an environmentalist, and she wants to show that one can be both a nuclear advocate and care about the environment. Emily also expresses the need for being bold, especially when advocating for real science that can benefit humanity.

A full career in GE Hitachi Nuclear Energy (0:08)
0:08-7:27 (Glen describes what inspired him to study nuclear engineering and how he started working with GE.)

Q. You got started in Florida?
A. Glen’s father worked for Motorola. One of his father’s customers was Florida Power and Light. This gave Glen the opportunity to tour the Saint Lucie nuclear plant at a young age. Later as an architectural engineering student at the University of Florida, Glen attended a class where each engineering department head discussed their engineering focus. The nuclear engineering professor gave a passionate explanation of the industry, causing Glen to change majors to become a nuclear engineering student. He has been in the industry ever since.

Glen graduated from college one week before the 3 Mile Island accident. He notes that the late 1970s was a time for activism. Local groups were energized by the “not in my backyard” mentality and spoke against building nuclear plants in their neighborhood. However, this type of action was localized and not nationwide.

GE’s Edison Engineering Program enabled Glen to work in a different area of GE’s nuclear wing every 6 months over a 2 year period. The program also enabled Glen to take classes at UC Berkeley, where he was able to graduate with a master’s degree. This program gave Glen an idea of what he was interested in: looking into how the core interacts with the rest of the plant. He worked in a team that created the interface between the fuel designers and plant designers to understand system integration. The team looking into how systems interact with one another, including both normal operating systems and safety functions. Glen is now the Vice-President & Chief Engineer of GE Hitachi Nuclear Energy.

Uncovering GE’s past to reevaluate nuclear systems (7:28)
7:28-13:04 (Glen discusses the changes to reactor designs over time and how many designs remerge throughout GE’s history.)

Q. Removing heat from the core is one of the limiting factors that determines the size of the whole system, right?
A. It is dictated by the available turbine technology. Plants are optimized for steam flow conditions. The reactor design has changed over time to accommodate different flow rates of steam. Turbines have been redesigned to handle the increased steam flow, but pressure has not changed due to the requirement of reanalyzing every component of the primary system if pressure were to increase. Increasing pressure, therefore, comes down to a cost benefit analysis to understand if the increased efficiency percentage is worth the added cost. Additionally, super heat cycles have been looked into in the past, but it was determined that material issues do not make super heat cycles economical for nuclear plants. This is reevaluated every 10-15 years to see if new materials create more cost efficient solutions.

Glen has the opportunity to look into GE’s history to gain insight into the ideas that repeatedly emerge. He gives the example that in 1951, GE signed a contract with the Atomic Energy Commission to gain access to classified nuclear technology documents. This enabled GE to study 8 different reactor designs to move towards designing and building a commercial reactor. At the time, GE adopted the Boiling Water Reactor (BWR) and Graphite Moderated Water Cooled Reactor designs. Most of the technology seen today has been looked into in the past, such as the new BWRX300, which is based off the same technology seen in 1951. Material technology changes, making some designs more feasible today than they were in the past. It is important to continue uncovering things from GE’s past to take advantage of what was learned then.

GE’s involvement in government programs (13:05)
13:05-18:00 (Glen describes the various nuclear projects that GE worked on with the US government.)

Q. The early industry had the opportunity to adopt other technologies, but comparisons pushed for PWRs and BWRS over other technologies, right?
A. Besides Pressurized Water Reactors (PWRs), GE was looking at different technologies than most of the industry at the time. For example, GE was working on developing a Sodium Fast Reactor. GE worked independently of the US Navy and Rickover because GE was focused on commercial development.

While commercial development is a priority for GE, the company has been involved with the US military and the government’s nuclear efforts. GE developed the Knolls Atomic Power Lab to research power reactor development. During WWII, GE provided technology and electrical equipment for such things as aircraft carriers. From 1946 until the mid 1960s, GE ran the Hanford Site and were responsible for the reactors that produced plutonium for the US’s weapons program. In the late 1940s and 1950s, GE worked with the US government on the aircraft nuclear propulsion program, which looked into powering aircrafts indefinitely using small reactors.

Cost and regulation limit nuclear potential (18:01)
18:01-22:56 (Glen explains that the slowed innovation was due to new regulations, which the industry did not push back against.)

Q. We have access to this magical technology, but we have not embraced it. Why have we not unlocked this potential?
A. Looking back, GE did discuss other technologies and uses for nuclear power, but ultimately cost limited GE’s actions. It was important that the nuclear industry could compete with the existing energy industries while adequately protecting the environment and the public. Unfortunately, nuclear lost the competitive edge in 1979 with new regulations. Design and build slowed, creating uncertainties and driving up cost.

The nuclear industry did not push back against these new regulations because the industry does not have an effective public relations strategy. It stems from the fear of radiation. The large catastrophic potential accidents that many people think about are much worse than the actual probability of an accident. The nuclear industry has not been successful in portraying risk in the way the average person can accept. Glen is frustrated by this because he has spent the last 40 years working to improve the nuclear industry. He has spent a great deal of time convincing people of the benefits of nuclear energy but is faced with the predispositions people have and a lacking ability to accept nuclear power. He believes this stems from a rising lack of trust in corporations.

Regulations limit nuclear build speed (22:57)
22:57-29:32 (Glen explains that GE has lost building speed due to increased regulations and limited ability to refine the regulation process.)

Q. How many plants have you worked on during your 40 years?
A. In 1979, GE had 20 plants under construction and was putting on line 2 to 3 plants each year. GE has lost this speed and there is concern within GE that the capacity and knowledge to build at the rate of 1979 is lacking. However, the requirements for the nuclear industry are no different from other energy sectors regarding the design, testing and qualification processes. Further, 90% of a nuclear facility is a steam powered power plant with primarily civil, mechanical and structural engineers as staff. Regulations keep the nuclear industry from moving as fast as the coal industry. This is because coal plants only require protective devices on equipment and because the nuclear industry is reluctant to change. Even today, the perceived cost of adopting digital systems means that some protection systems are still analogue.

Relaxing regulations regarding digital systems are in the works, making it clear that restricting digital systems prevents systems from being as safe as they can be. However, many regulations are written at a high level, requiring qualitative analysis, which slows the regulation process. There has been some attempt at streamlining the regulation process for new plants, but because the nuclear industry suffers from a lack of scale, there is little opportunity to refine and improve the regulatory process through multiple iterations.

Limitations to experimental and international projects (29:33)
29:33-36:00 (Glen discusses GE’s experiment reactors, the waves of development and experimentation throughout history and the reasons why GE does not rapidly build in other countries).

Q. Is there any ability within the nuclear industry to just gain experience building?
A. GE has a history of working with the US government to build testing reactors for national laboratories. One example is the PRISM sodium fast reactor, which is the basis for the new Versatile Test Reactor (VTR). Building test reactors relies on government-sponsored development programs because energy is not handled well by the free market. Startups have an inability to take these projects on due to the extremely high cost associated with nuclear projects.

There were periods of high development and experimentation during the 1950s and 1960s, the 1990s and today. Overall, nuclear development comes in waves. Accident events may cause these waves, but development has always continued. The Department of Energy (DoE) initiated funding for a post 3 Mile Island reactor that was not water-based. There is nothing fundamentally wrong with water-based system and they are inherently safe, but there are many hurdles to overcome in demonstrating their safety to regulators.

When attempting to build in countries that do not have nuclear regulations in place, it comes down to local regional politics. GE does not try to get around regulations and have been talking to a number of countries around the world, many of which follow the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) requirements. GE wants to ensure that the recipient country has reliable and acceptable liability laws before entering into a project. Building in countries without an established nuclear regime comes with different challenges to those of the US, such as the need for nuclear education.

Readopting the natural circulation system (36:01)
36:01-41:17 (Glen explains the old designs he wants to see used in new designs, including the natural circulation system.)

Q. What are some of the design features that you have seen in the old plants that you would like to see incorporated into new designs?
A. The old plants were much more simple. More complexity brings higher cost. Glen would like to see the readoption of natural circulation, a feature seen in designs from the 1960s. Forced circulation was used to make systems more economical, but better understanding and materials means that natural circulation should be readopted. Natural circulation operates on the fact that the density of water inside the core is low because it is boiling. The colder feed water is dense, so gravity drives the flow in natural circulation. In a Boiling Water Reactor (BWR), there is 1,000 pounds of pressure to drive the condensed steam back into the vessel. The benefit of natural circulation is not only that it eliminates pumps, pipes and valves, but it also decreases the risk that a pipe could break, which would cause a loss of coolant accident.

Designing without regard to the loss of coolant accident (41:18)
41:18-47:50 (Glen explains how to design an optimized plant based not on the loss of coolant accident, but on the most likely risk scenario.)

Q. Has anyone pushed to forget about the loss of coolant accident to design a system that does not account for this accident?
A. Risk-based licensing gives GE the ability to do this through design. This requires the understanding of how to design a plant based on the next most likely scenario: a station blackout. Regarding the loss of coolant accident, the industry has yet to raise the point that it should not be listed as the primary risk. Down the road, risk-based designs can be further improved to design based on a different set of assumptions that create safer, lower cost facilities. Designing without the loss of coolant accident as the focus will lead to smaller designs, decreasing the amount of concrete, and therefore cost, associated with the plant. Ultimately, designing is all about tradeoffs and optimizations.

Achieving GE’s nuclear goals (47:51)
47:51-53:39 (Glen explains his goals for the future of nuclear for GE and the wider sector.)

Q. What do you think is an achievable building target for the BWRX300?
A. Glen believes 2 years should be GE’s target for designing and building the new BWRX300 reactor. To be competitive, GE must design for cost. Change control is the number one issue within the design process, meaning only design changes that support the mission should be approved. Achieving this target also relies on looking outside of the nuclear industry to understand how other sectors build large underground structures quickly. Additionally, GE must further understand how much of the BWRX300 can be pre-built and assembled on site.

Moving forwards, GE is focusing on how to make the BWRX300 more cost effective. GE is also working on the new VTR to renew the sector’s testing ability. GE is also focused on the continued operation of their current fleet of reactors with the goal of improving fuel efficiency to lower operation costs. Maintaining the fleet is necessary to building the bridge towards the new reactors.

For Glen, the future of nuclear depends on understanding that nuclear power can not be the only solution to achieving sustainable energy. Nuclear energy must be used as part of the solution along with other clean energy sources.

Aligning values with career growth (0:08)
0:08-7:33 (Mona explains how she came to the US from Egypt and her role in GE.)

Q. You are from Egypt, correct? When did you come to the US?
A. Mona Badie is from Egypt and worked as a technical consultant in Abu Dhabi. She visited the US in 1990, but stayed permanently when the Gulf War broke out. Mona then got a masters degree in electrical engineering from Purdue University where she first became interested in computer science. After graduation, she worked as a software developer for Poloroid and Fitch before joining GE Capital (the financial arm of GE). Her role there was to develop touchless software, which helped customers obtain loans or leases in a secure and seamless way.

After about 10 years at GE Capital, Mona saw an available position in the nuclear wing of GE. At the time, she was looking to move from capital into industry and her passion for the environment pushed her to apply for the position. Mona is able to align her values with her intellectual curiosity and is now the Chief Information Officer and Chief Digital Officer of GE Hitachi Nuclear Energy.

Using data to decrease cost (7:34)
7:34-17:41 (Mona explains the challenges she focuses on and how she leverages data to reduce operation and maintenance costs.)

Q. What are some of the projects you are working on?
A. Mona focuses on the challenges that the nuclear industry faces and finds solutions from a data analytics and software perspective. Mona has identified cost as the biggest challenge for nuclear. On average, nuclear power costs the industry $33 per megawatt hour. The cost to the gas industry, however, is $25 per megawatt hour. The major cost for gas is fuel while the majority of the nuclear cost stems from operations and maintenance. Mona therefore focuses on reducing the cost of plant operation and maintenance to help make nuclear more competitive.

To reduce costs, the nuclear industry must first understand that there is a problem. Mona entered the industry 4 years ago with fresh eyes and was easily able to see that the cost of operation and maintenance was an issue that needed to be addressed. She notes that the nuclear industry has a wealth of data but, compared to the consumer industry, nuclear is not leveraging data to benefit business. Building equipment profiles based on data can create a more efficient, plant-specific maintenance plan. Currently, equipment maintenance is based on time, meaning a piece of equipment may undergo maintenance every 3 months whether or not is needs it. Mona hopes to change this by moving to a condition-based maintenance system. For example, each plant will have a profile based on the design and the data that pertains to its specific equipment. Data collected from manual inspection rounds, work orders and sensors can be pulled together to understand how the equipment is performing. This can be used to determine when maintenance needs to occur, saving time and cost.

Leveraging the cloud for more efficient operation (17:42)
17:42-21:08 (Mona explains that predicted maintenance software has already been deployed in some plants. She also notes the strategy for dealing with the NRC and how this software will be used in the future).

Q. How do we test that condition-based maintenance works?
A. This software has already been deployed in some plants. The biggest challenge is understanding how to bring the data from different systems together so it can be analyzed in one place. Mona’s solution involves using cloud storage to store all data in a single platform. This software reduces the labor costs associated with manually collected operation and maintenance data. Additionally, this predicted maintenance brings great value to the nuclear industry.

It is notoriously difficult to get approval from the NRC when making changes like this. Mona’s strategy is therefore to avoid changing maintenance schedules to safety equipment, which is highly regulated. Additionally, Mona points out that this software only makes recommendations and does not automate or enforce change. The plant operator is still able to decide whether or not to adopt condition-based maintenance.

Mona is also looking to new reactor developers who have yet to set up fully integrated sensors in their systems. This holds the biggest opportunity for the nuclear industry, enabling engineers to think ahead about not just how to design a plant, but how to operate it. Predictive maintenance software will enable plants to be operated in a more efficient and intelligent way.

Making nuclear cool (22:08)
22:08-29:50 (Mona discusses her passion for change advocacy and why she focuses on moving away from the safety discussion and towards one on innovation and how to make the industry cool.)

Q. Tell me about your passion for change advocacy.
A. Nuclear change advocacy involves talking to both the public and to those within the nuclear industry itself. The culture within the industry has not yet embraced innovation. Focusing on safety is important, but innovation can occur while still being compliant with safety regulations. Mona stresses the importance of rethinking why the industry does certain things to find simplified solutions that are more productive.

Changing the culture within the industry starts with a conversation. Mona also has the data to support why change will improve processes and reduce cost. Talking to a wide range of people is key, including utility executives and conference attendees. Moving away from discussions focusing only on safety will also spur change as leading with a safety perspective tends to scare people. Mona finds that many are open to embracing innovation while others are more resistant to moving away from the safety conversation.

Making nuclear cool to the public can also help grow the industry. Small modular reactor (SMR) investment from companies and the likes of Bill Gates is beginning to make the nuclear industry seem cool. Understanding how to make atom splitting more popular than mobile app development is also key to securing the future of nuclear power.

Mona is optimistic about the future of nuclear energy. The industry may be in a dip currently, but Mona is sure the industry will recover, especially as more SMRs are built. Software and data analytics will help push the industry forward, gaining more insights into how to run efficient plants. Reducing cost is key to ensuring a future powered by nuclear energy.

Following in his father’s GE footsteps (0:08)
0:08-10:59 (Jon explains how he transitioned from studying computational chemistry to a career in GE’s nuclear project.)

Q. I’d love to start with your story and how you got into the sector.
A. Jon comes from a background in chemistry. After graduating from Penn State with a PhD, Jon moved to Washington State where he worked in research and development for Westinghouse at the Hanford nuclear site. His role was to look into the high level tank waste generated during the process of separating uranium and plutonium during fission. The Hanford site had produced 50 million gallons of this high level waste, and Jon’s role was to analyze this waste using different methods to create the perfect fission product yield curve. Jon also worked on characterizing the waste to be vitrified, or the process of turning waste into glass logs. To do this, Jon used radiological methods and mass spectrometry to understand the isotopes present in the waste, whose chemistry is constantly changing due to the decaying properties of radioactive materials. This work really cemented Jon’s fascination with nuclear energy.

After 5 years at the Hanford site, Jon was recruited by GE to work at a nuclear site in North Carolina. Jon’s father had worked for GE for over 20 years and had a strong interest in computers. This meant that Jon had access to computers from an early age, sparking his interest in AI and programming, which he used in graduate school when studying computational chemistry, the use of computers to identify the geometry of organic compounds to predict their chemical properties.

At GE, Jon’s first role was in fuel manufacturing operation as a laboratory manager. He was in charge of testing the quality of uranium. He then become the Quality Leader for GE’s fuel business and later led manufacturing operations. He is now GE’s Executive Vice President of the Nuclear Plant Projects.

Over Jon’s GE career, he has seen GE focus on both change and perfection. For example, GE has introduced new fuels, such as the change from GE14 to GNF2 fuel, which are 10x10 boiling water reactor fuels. GE has also focused on how to run operations to be safer and drive productivity. While automation and robots can be used to do this, Jon focuses on the principles of Lean Manufacturing and the Toyota production system. These ways of producing faster allow GE to identify waste and areas in which they can make jobs easier for the operator by giving them what they need, when and where they need it.

Upgrading nuclear power plants (11:00)
11:00-18:29 (Jon describes the different engineering services that GE provides including EPUs and Outage Management.)

Q. What kind of services does GE offer?
A. GE offers services that cover the breadth of a nuclear power plant. In terms of engineering services, GE focuses on upgrades, such as Extended Power Upright (EPU) which can increase a plant’s power output by 20%. Although upgrades can be costly, they are much cheaper than building a new plant. GE has so far implemented enough EPUs to equivalent the power generation of 3 new plants. GE created the Licensing Topical Report (LTR) which outlines a process for how to implement EPUs.

Another engineering service that GE offers is Outage Management. During this field service, GE will shut down a plant and take the reactor apart. They will conduct inspections and address any issues, such as cracks, that may have arisen over the last 12 to 24 months. They will repair or analyse these issues to determine if modification, repair or monitoring is needed. During repairs, GE takes the ALARA (As Low As Reasonably Achievable) approach, meaning minimizing the time and distance spent repairing with respect to radiation. These means GE prefers to use automated and submarine tools, but may require underwater welding in some cases.

There are three types of uprights. The first is the Measurement Uncertainty Recapture (MUR), which improves output by 1.5%. The second is the Stretch Upright which increases power by 5%. The last is the EPU, which increases power by 20%. Some of GE’s customers have increased power by 121.5% through EPU and a MUR. The amount a plant can upgrade is limited, however, primarily by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s (NRC) licensing process. Because GE has the LTR, it can be applied to any plant that GE evaluates. Each plant undergoes a specific analysis and a unique roadmap is created. This is used by the plant operators to gain approval from the NRC to operate at a higher power.

The road to the BWRX300 (18:30)
18:30-27:51 (Jon discusses his current role in GE and the realization which led to the design of the new BWRX300.)

Q. Does this bring us to what you do today?
A. After working in GE’s fuel, service, manufacturing and supply chain segments, Jon entered the new plant division of GE’s nuclear project. This role has evolved over the 4 years he has been in the position. GE had been focusing on Economic Simplified Boiling Water Reactors (ESBWR). In 2014, NRC had licensed 2 ESBWRs for construction and operation: Dominion (a US utility company) and Detroite Edison (DTE). For Dominion, the low gas prices at the time meant that they could no longer justify the large investment, so the project was suspended. This prompted Jon to recognize the need to rethink the market. The ESBWRs produce 1500 megawatts of electricity, creating a niche market for such a large reactor. GE needed to reconsider the economics of their products and decide what to put forward.

GE had been designing microreactors and Small Modular Reactors (SMRs) in the 1940s. At the time, the nuclear industry was more focused on building large reactors. But low gas prices and large nuclear projects around the world that were running over time and budget caused GE to return to their small reactor designs. Jon put together a small team of GE’s best and brightest and took over the ideation site for 2 months to figure out the new design. The team first began looking at PRISM (Power Reactive Innovative Small Module), which is a sodium fast reactor that has been around since the 1980s. After speaking to customers, the team learned that building new nuclear plants meant understanding how to compete with Combined Cycle Gas and that customers were not interested in investing more than $1billion in a new plant. The team knew they needed to focus on simplicity to drive down costs, and pivoted to look into how they could downsize the ESBWR, which had a proven technology and supply chain. The team realized that they could eliminate the loss of coolant accident, meaning many systems and structures of the plant could be removed. This game changing design became known as the BWRX300 (Boiling Water Reactor, 10th Generation, 300 output) and GE rushed to protect the idea through patent disclosures and identified partners and investors to push the project forward.

Making BWRX300 a commercial reality (27:52)
27:52-33:08 (Jon explains the factors affecting the commercialization of the BWRX300).

Q. How do you take the next steps to make it a commercial reality?
A. It all starts with an investor, which in the BWRX300 case was Dominion. GE then began collaborating with Bechtel, Exolon and MIT. Identifying markets is also key, and Jon notes that Canada has a strong SMR market. The US will eventually be a strong market for BWRX300, but only once nuclear finds a way to compete with the US’s low gas prices. Determining nuclear price point is important and includes understanding the total build cost, determining the market that GE can enter and identifying how well capitalized a customer has to be to take on a nuclear project. The price of the electricity produced by a nuclear plant competes with natural gas and is affected by the overall plant size. This means GE takes on a design for cost approach, including using off the shelf solutions which do not require much modification. Additionally, areas which will be retiring coal plants over the next several decades are key to making the BWRX300 a commercial reality. A coal plant can be replaced by a 300 megawatt nuclear plant. This smaller plant size also works well for countries that are lacking a developed infrastructure and can not take on a high power producing nuclear plant.

The BWRX300 strategy (33:09)
33:09-41.58 (Jon explains the licensing and siting strategies for the BWRX300.)

Q. What is the BWRX300 strategy?
A. There are lots of discussions on this topic of replacing coal plants. GE has limited resources and time, so they focus on the areas of the world that show the greatest promise for adopting nuclear. This includes looking into which regions have a nuclear regime in place, understanding if GE will be able to export produced energy, and predict government approvals. GE engages in both short and long term thinking.

The licensing approach for the BWRX300 is also taking on a different strategy. This is because the licensing is borrowed from the ESBWR license. GE spent hundreds of millions of dollars certifying the ESBWR design with the help of the US Department of Energy (DoE). This significant investment indirectly supports the BWRX300, shortening the licensing process. Additionally, GE is taking a Part 50 instead of a Part 52 approach. Part 52 is when a design is certified before a utility is licensed to construct and operate. Part 50, on the other hand, enables construction to begin earlier, creating more flexibility in the design process. Although it presents the risk that the NRC will not sign off on the final design after construction, it avoids the problem that GE faced with the ESBWR where large investment is put into the design of a plant, but it is ultimately not constructed.

Countries that stand out to GE as potential BWRX300 sites include Canada and the UK for their expressed interest in SMRs. There is, however, promise in a number of regions around the globe. A potential site must have the infrastructure and capital to support a BWRX300 project, but the Export Import Bank can help with a country’s financing. Additionally, the BWRX300 reactors cost less that $1 billion, increasing their accessibility to a larger range of countries.

A future with cheaper nuclear power (41:59)
41:59-46:03 (Jon notes the PRISM VTR project and his goals for the future of the nuclear industry.)

Q. Tell us the story about where PRISM is going and your thoughts on the future of nuclear.
A. Last year, the Nuclear Energy Innovation and Capabilities Act (NEICA) was signed into US law. This called for a Versatile Test Reactor (VTR) to be built by the end of 2025. GE entered the competitive bid and won due to their PRISM design, which the DoE had previously invested in. The VTR will test fast neutrons rather than produce electricity which will help support the research and development of fast reactors. The PRISM VTR is foundational to moving the industry towards generating cheaper nuclear products.

For Jon, the future of nuclear relied on shifting towards the adoption of SMRs, advanced reactors and microreactors. He foresees nuclear being used in high temperature industrial applications and in remote areas of Alaska and Canada that currently rely on expensive diesel fuel. Jon hopes to see advanced reactors turn fuel into an asset where reactors can recycle and burn plutonium and for SMRs to become cost competitive. He believes that nuclear power will play a significant role in long term power generation for the US and that nuclear will help reach decarbonization goals.

From student to nuclear professor (0:17)
0:17 - 5:23 (George discusses his first introduction to nuclear and the classes he taught at UCLA and MIT.)

Q. How did you first get into nuclear energy?
A. George was born in Greece and obtained a degree in electrical engineering. George then attended CalTech for both his Master’s and PhD. In 1974, he went on to become an associate professor at UCLA in the department of mechanical and nuclear engineering and moved to MIT in 1995 to teach in the department of nuclear science and engineering.

George became interested in nuclear risk assessment as an associate professor, becoming a pioneer in this field. He helped establish courses on nuclear reactor safety and probabilistic risk assessment, which is still available at UCLA. At MIT, George taught a popular course on reliability, decision analysis, and risk assessment. In 2010, George became an NRC commissioner and is now the Head of Research for the Nuclear Risk Research Center in Japan.

Using probability to safeguard against risk (5:24)
5:24 - 13:51 (George discusses what probability means for nuclear risk and the first methods used to determine risk and safeguard against it.)

Q. What are the main methodologies that are used to understand risk, safety and technological systems?
A. The basic rules of probability create the backbone for risk assessments. This includes the probability of the union of events, intersection of events, elementary probability theory and statistics. Most importantly, understanding what probability means is key for risk assessments. Unlike looking at probability as relative frequency, nuclear reactor events are very rare, meaning conceptual problems arise when taking a relative frequency approach. Fortunately, probability can also be seen as a measure of confidence. This relies on evidence, which is established in repeated trials or from new information, such as new statistics and expert opinions. Statistics and expert judgements come together to form state of knowledge, which is expressed through probabilities. These probabilities are put into a probabilistic risk assessment (PRA), which is a distribution of probabilities that express uncertainty.

In the early days of nuclear energy, physicists realized that nuclear accidents were a possibility. In the 1950’s-60’s, scientists were unable to quantify this risk, so they created the concepts of Defense In Depth and Safety Margins. Defense in Depth are the multiple barriers put in place to prevent release of radioactivity in the event of an accent. Safety Margins make sure there is a margin between the operational and failure points, such as temperature. Together, these decrease the probability of an accident. These deterministic and prescriptive principles created the basis of the regulatory system. This bottom up, primarily technical approach focuses on the idea that designing a plant to withstand severe accidents will ensure smaller accidents will also be covered.

Quantifying risk to influence regulation (13:52)
13:52-23:56 (George discusses PRAs and how they came to be used in regulatory matters.)

Q. The RSS was the first PRA?
A. PRAs, on the other hand, take a top down approach and are not focused solely on technologically caused accidents. The first PRA was the Reactor Safety Study (RSS) published in 1974 by the Atomic Energy Commission. It looked at the entire plant and brainstormed every possible accident, including those caused by human error. PRAs focus on 3 questions: what can go wrong, how likely is it, and what are the consequences? Millions of potential accident sequences are generated using computers by looking only at the plant level and not taking regulations into consideration. These accident sequences are then ranked by likelihood of occurrence and the consequences are determined. In general, the dominant nuclear accident sequences total 15 to 20, which is far less than those determined for space shuttles (about 1,000 single failure dominant accident sequences). This difference is because nuclear plants include Defense in Depth measures which protect against single failure accident sequences. This is often not possible for aircrafts that must consider weight for flight.

During the late 1970’s, the NRC received criticism and pressure from engineers who did not study probability and from society who thought the RSS underestimated risks. Because of this, the NRC told staff not to use the RSS in regulatory matters. Unfortunately, Three Mile Island occurred in 1979, which had been mentioned as a possible sequence of events in the RSS. This accident moved the NRC towards using the RSS in regulations and setting acceptable probability levels. In 1986, the NRC issued the Quantitative Health Objectives or Safety Goals, which state that the accident probability should be less than 1/10th of 1% of all other risks. While the NRC submitted regulations to decrease risk, they were unpopular within the industry who did not see significant safety improvements. To appease the industry, the NRC issued a regulatory guide known as 1.174, stating how risk information can be used in regulatory affairs.

Becoming an NRC commissioner (23:57)
23:57 - 30:38 (George discusses his role in the development of 1.174 and his position with the NRC as a commissioner.)

Q. What was your role in 1.174?
A. George was appointed to the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) in 1995 and undertook an advisory role in the creation of 1.174 in 1997. This guide focused on how to use both traditional methods of Defense in Depth and Safety Margins alongside PRA to create a risk informed approach to regulation. George considers 1.174 to be one of the major achievements of NRC staff.

After 15 years on the ACRS, George was appointed by the White House to join the NRC as a commissioner. George moved to Washington DC in 2010 and managed a staff of 6, including a technical advisor on nuclear materials, an advisor on nuclear reactors and a legal advisor. In this role, George spoke with many stakeholders, receiving visits from industry who voiced complaints or advocated for particular things. George was one of five commissioners who are subject to special rules, including one stating that no more than three commissioners could be in the same room at the same time.

The NRC’s reaction to Fukushima (30:39)
30:39 - 37:42 (George describes the aftermath of Fukushima)

Q. A year after joining the NRC as commissioner, Fukushima happens. What was this experience like?
A. People were scared, especially on the West Coast. In the beginning, Japan was reluctant to accept foreign aid, but changed their position once the scope of the accident became more apparent. In Washington, the NRC chairman was called to the White House and a member of the NRC staff was sent to Fukushima as an adviser. The NRC also formed the Near Term Task Force (NTTF) to make comprehensive recommendations on what actions the US could take.

The first 2-3 recommendations were under Adequate Protection, meaning the NRC held no discussion with industry and implementation was mandatory. Adequate Protection is a concept that ensures adequate protection of public health and safety without the consideration of cost. These regulations are infrequent and only created when absolutely necessary. The other recommendations made by the NTTF were varying degrees of urgency and some recommendations are still under consideration today.

Japan’s nuclear industry after Fukushima (37:43)
37:43 - 46:03 (George discusses the extreme measures Japan undertook to restart their nuclear industry post Fukushima. He also describes the differences between the US’s and Japan’s approach to nuclear regulation and the creation of the NRRC.)

Q. Did your work on the Fukushima recommendations lead to your involvement with the new research center in Japan?
A. After Fukushima, Japan’s plants were shut down and their regulatory system was reinvisioned. The Nuclear Regulation Authority (NRA) was established, which took the opposite approach to the prior regime of being intertwined with industry. This system was more extreme than the US, becoming completely isolated from industry. The stringent new regulations cost plants hundreds of millions of dollars to restart operations. Additionally, local governments in Japan were given the power to disagree with the NRA’s safety decisions, meaning local mayors could stop a plant from regaining operation. George sees this as a problem because it is unclear on what basis a local government is using to determine plant safety.

PRAs were also taken more seriously in Japan post Fukushima. In 2014, the Central Research Institute for the Electric Power Industry (CRIEPI), which was established in the early 1950s, created the Nuclear Risk Research Center (NRRC). The NRRC focuses on PRAs, nuclear risk and risk management. After George’s tenure on the NRC ended in 2014, he became the NRRC’s Head of Research.

The challenges of communicating nuclear risk (46:04)
46:04 - 55:10 (George describes his role in the NRRC and the challenges involved in communicating nuclear risk.)

Q. 46:04 - 55:10 What is your role as Head of Research in the NRRC?
A: George works to develop probabilistic models for natural disasters, including tsunamis and earthquakes. He also creates strategic plans (how to use risk information in decision making) and action plans (how to implement strategic plans). George hopes to move Japan away from a deterministic process and towards one that adopts the concept of risk management.

George also works on communicating Japan’s new nuclear culture to various stakeholders through newspapers articles and meetings with senior people, such as Chief Nuclear Officers (CNOs). This has its challenges because the nuclear establishment has been educated and operated in a traditional engineering environment, which is resistant to change.

Communicating with the public is also challenging. Many Japanese communities have a negative attitude towards nuclear energy because they feel they were lied to regarding plant safety. Public attitudes are slowly changing, which is critical in restarting plants in local communities. Similar to public views in the US after Three Mile Island, Japanese public confidence is shaken. It may take many more years before Japan widely supports nuclear energy.

A future with cheaper, safer nuclear reactors (55:11)
55:11- 1:00:15 (George states his view on the future of nuclear energy, focusing on the economic and safety advantages of SMRs.)

Q. Where do you see the industry going and what do we need to think about in the future?
A. In the US, the state of the nuclear industry is not good. Because of Defense in Depth and other safety measures, plants cost billions of dollars to build. Additionally, fracking has caused natural gas to become inexpensive. The cost difference between nuclear and natural gas is significant, greatly influencing investment funds and threatening the future of nuclear.

To counter this economic problem, the development of SMRs must be supported. Because of the small, modular design, SMRs relieve the financial burden of new construction. Electricity can be generated immediately after one unit is built, unlike large reactors that require spending billions of dollars prior to producing a single megawatt. SMRs are also safer than large reactors because they require smaller radioactive material storage.

Dan Poneman’s Interest in Energy

Q: Tell me your story and how you ended up in energy?

Dan Poneman is the former Deputy Secretary of Energy and a senior fellow at the Belfer Center, which is a part of the Harvard Kennedy School. He developed an interest in policy during a summer internship in the office of Senator John Glenn during university, when he was given a research assignment into Nuclear Proliferation Treaties. Throughout his studies, he developed an interest in European nuclear policy and wrote his undergraduate thesis on why France had more success in creating nuclear policy than Germany.

Poneman’s graduate thesis was focused on the European side nuclear policy during a time when the developing world was interested in acquiring nuclear energy as well. The question at that time was whether these countries wanted nuclear weapons or nuclear energy for other purposes. These questions were the motivation for his first book, Nuclear Power in the Developing World, written in 1982.

Transition to Policy Work

Q: Where were you working in 1982 and what compelled you to write that book? (6:47)

Poneman had just finished at Oxford and had spent some time at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London where he produced the book. He was still in law school at that time so, after London, he returned to the US to finish his law degree. Argentina had been a case study in his first book so after completing his degree, he expanded that case study into another book. Afterwards, he returned to the US again and practiced law for about four years.

His upbringing in Toledo, OH gave him very little exposure to Latin American culture and history, so when he arrived in Argentina, he became enthralled. He wanted to understand the history of how military conflict and political power struggles had prevented such a sophisticated and intelligent people from achieving everything that they could have by that time regarding nuclear energy policy.

After writing the book, he practiced law for about four years and was still fascinated by national security, foreign and energy policies. He was invited to join a White House Fellowship and landed in the Energy Department. His first big project was the Pressler Amendment which required that the US president annually certified that Pakistan did not have a nuclear weapon and that US was aid was not contributing to any nuclear program.

The US gathered too much evidence of nuclear activity in Pakistan at that time for President George H.W. Bush to certify the country per the agreement. After that, Poneman was recruited to the National Security Council as the first person assigned exclusively to nuclear non-proliferation in ten years. Many hot topics were being discussed at that time such as the denuclearization of Iraq and others, and many of those recruited to the council were assigned from other governmental agencies.

Transition to Clinton Administration

Q: Why did you survive the transition from Bush to Clinton? (15:06)

After Clinton won the election, the National Security Council staff was interviewed by the transition team about imminent threats. Poneman informed the incoming administration about the ongoing negotiations around the Megatons to Megawatts program with Russia. This was a deal with Russia to blend down 500 metric tons of highly enriched uranium to commercial reactor fuel for purchase.

Tom Neff of MIT developed the written theory that helped develop the program because there was fear at the time that the break-up of the Soviet Union would result in four nuclear states. There was an effort in the administration to deal with what was called “hemorrhage” of fissile materials, intellect, and technology. The stability of policy on proliferation provided a playbook to governments and militaries on how to negotiate and develop a successful plan. At that time, It was a bigger challenge to demonstrate the benefits of nuclear energy, particularly in climate change, because of the negative perception borne of things like weapons and radiation.

Q: How long were you deputy secretary and where did you go from there? (21:36)

Poneman was asked to negotiate with the Iranians in Vienna on the Tehran research reactor issue. Then-Secretary of State, Bill Burns, had already finished negotiations in Geneva and the government wanted to hold more technical discussions. Mohamed ElBaradei was the head of the International Atomic Energy Agency at the time and was hosting the talks between France, Russia, Iran, and the United States.

All of the countries were able to agree to ship out low enriched uranium fuel in exchange for a foreign supply of 20 percent enriched uranium to go into the Tehran Research Reactor, which was a source of medical radioactive isotopes. The agreement was ad referendum, so each country had to get approval from their governments before the agreement was finalized. Due to internal political power struggles, Iran was the only government not to sign on in the end.

While at the Department of Energy, Poneman also worked on the Energy Coordinating Committee which focused on resilience against storms, cybersecurity and more. In preparation for Hurricane Sandy, the CEO of Edison Electric invited the Department of Energy to join the calls and lend support from the federal government. President Obama also joined these discussions and began conducting daily sessions to ensure that power could be restored quickly after the storm hit land.

The direction from the White House was that the president’s priority was an immediate risk to life and power restoration, and Poneman had to work with CEOs of energy companies to create a solid plan for how to manage that. It was a great lesson in leadership from President Obama and also in the importance of building trusting relationships with CEOs in the private sector for these types of projects.

Q: Why was there no urgent “get it done” moment for the administration on climate change? (30:24)

If a leader has enough monetary and political influence, they should not need public support to accomplish something significant. The MIT study on climate change demonstrates that incremental changes are no longer sufficient and deep decarbonization will require leadership on drastic measures.

When airplane production became a priority in the United States, the manufacturing increased exponentially. People feel a sense of urgency about climate change, but there is still too much anxiety in the public about nuclear energy to create that type of rapid growth. Partially, this may be from the fear of weapons and radiation mentioned earlier, but it is also impacted by how the industry communicates the message of nuclear energy.

When professionals in the field discuss hazardous waste and safety too much, it implies that there is something about the energy that people should fear. Terminology used may heighten fear instead of discussing the benefits and highlighting the reasons why it may be safer than other alternatives.

Far more money has been spent on the Hanford cleanup site versus fixing the water crisis in Flint, MI. This prioritization implies to the public that the Hanford site is more dangerous than lead in public water systems. Part of the reason why nuclear energy is so expensive is because of the requirements for the cleanup process. The As Low As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) standard forces standards beyond what is reasonable. Rather than clean up to the point of being harmless, the requirements are to clean to the point of being like glass.

This failure to accurately communicate from the nuclear energy community has created such a false sense of fear that it has resulted in populations seeking out energy sources that are less clean and safe. The industry needs to find a way to communicate what they internally understand to the public to effect change.

Dan Poneman’s Recent Book, Double Jeopardy

Q: Let’s talk about your book a little bit, what inspired it? (38:48)

The question that is asked in the book is whether or not society can benefit from the atom while still keeping nuclear weapons development at a minimum. Although nuclear reactors around the globe are being closed, there are innovative and exciting technologies in the field of nuclear energy like advanced generation reactors.

Poneman is now running an energy company that has joined with the Department of Energy in investing in some of these new technologies. They are building centrifuges in Ohio that will provide 19.75% high-assay, low enriched uranium that will be ideal for advanced reactor developers. These centrifuges will allow for a new combination of fuel, coolant, and moderator to enable advanced fuel cycles and create higher density. The production of uranium for testing from this project will begin in about three years.

Q: Let’s talk about the Paris Accord targets (45:07)

The agreement is a stepping stone, but it does not address the existing carbon in the air and how that will increase heat over time even as the changes in the agreement are implemented. The target of two degrees is far too high and will continue the climate crisis at that level, including the loss of coral reefs. Not only would these ecosystems be impacted, but there are communities of people that depend on these ecosystems as well.

Many in the environmental policy community still have negative opinions on nuclear energy themselves. Due to so many conflicting agendas, it has been a challenge to have intellectually honest discussions about what needs to happen on climate change. Solar energy, for example, is easy to accomplish up until a point, but it needs nuclear energy to be included for solar energy to reach its full potential.

The Paris Agreement is not all of what we need and there is no enforcement included in the agreement. Therefore, even if compliance is assumed by each country it will still not be enough to counteract climate change entirely. It has to be combined with a policy that changes things institutionally like a carbon tax and economic policies that continue to drive growth. The Montreal Convention is an example of how environmental policy can be effective without limiting economic growth.

Ponema’s new book’s purpose is the give policy recommendations that are rooted in history as well as economic and scientific data to make a change for current and future generations. He hopes that it inspires people to act and helps demonstrate that with some more support and innovation, nuclear energy policy can make the impact that the earth needs for decarbonization.

1) Timestamp 0-10
Bret Kugelmass: Where did your interest in energy begin?

Joseph Hezir: Joe studied Chemical Engineering and became interested in the policies involved with technology which is how he was introduced to energy. He was doing environmental engineering (working on research behind pollution control technology) and he took an open position at the Office of Management and Budget. He was on the staff at Carnegie Mellon University, trying to develop new APC technologies for the steel industry (from blast furnace operations).

How do we characterize these waste issues?

All processes have residuals discharged through the air, water, or solid waste. Theres increased recognition of these discharges and from a technical standpoint, now the engineering field needs to find ways to either reduce or clean up these emissions.

How do we keep track of the waste through regulations?
There are requirements for companies to monitor, report and control these discharges.

So what did you do at the OMB?
2 years after the federal water control act amendments of 1972 and they werent really being implemented yet. There were new federal programs implemented by the act and the EPA was in charge of these. He prepared and revealed the budgets for these programs and the regulations that were being issued by the EPA under these programs. The EPA has a gov wide regulatory oversight role charged througha seires of exectuvie orders 9and now bya statute) to ensure that the costs imposed on society are justified by the benefits and that theyre taking the most cost effective streamlined approach to regulating.

Does the different administrations change the regulations much?
Over time there’s been a gradual trend to have increased independent scrutiny irrespective of presidential administration, This is because the scope of federal regulatories has been increased to make sure the costs to society are justified.

Do we look at the net effect of these regulations on industrial processes?
Not on a regular basis, but there are periodic and systematic reviews, for example, of the clean air act. Its expensive and an extensive process to do so.

Who does this review? What happens if the review comes back negative?
In the environmental statues congress grants a lot of authority to the executive branch, primarily the EPA. There are stutatry touch points they have to meet but utlimately the EPA has a lot of discretion over the regualtions. Technical, scientific and economic aspects come into play in setting these regualtions

Bret Kugelmass: what jumped out a t you during your time here?

Joseph Hezir: OMB plays an important role beind the scenes because therea re issues at an interagency level and at OMB this is wehere these issues are illsutrated.

Whats a specific example?
Regulation of wetlands. The authority 2 issues permits for activities that affect wetlands was up to army corps of engineers but EPA had guidelines that the army corpa had to follow and they had different ideas of the extene tof those guidelines. Teh2 sets of regulatons ebing developed in parrallel led to daily meeitings with both parties in the room to come up with a common set of understanding. Rgulation of farming practices and wetlands was particulary difficult because wetlands tend to be near ag areas and so there had to be guidelines on what type of farming practices could be used near these ares. The department opf agriculture was also involved in theses discussion.

2) Timestamp 13
Bret Kugelmass: What looped you into the energy scene, through an MIT report?

Joseph Hezir: Still at OMB and after the iranian oil disruption in 1979. There was an opportunity to move frmo environemntal area to the energy area and he was interested in energy policy issues with respect to the oil markets. Dep of energy strategic oil researve program was set up to repsond to global disruption in energy market.

Why cant we have a giant energy reserve and keep the price levelized over decades?

Both in rep and dem administrations theres a reluctance to have the gocv interfer in global oil markrts and the market is global so even if we oculd regulate the US, we cant exercise control on a gloval scale. It would take an enxttemly large capacitor to buffer a global oil market. The policy ahs always been to ahve the reserve as a backstop to deal with severe supply interruptions of the embargo scale impacts on the makrer.

Now we have so much domestic oil we dont have to worry aout that?
Yes the markets ahve changed substantially. the pattern of petroleum supplies around the world shows the concentration in the middle east isnt as hgih as it once was and our domestic production is higer. In the 1980s (discovery of oils, oil thrust belt) and early 2000s ( unconventional oil and gas) lead us to now have an abundance and weve changed policy so that now werea ent oil exporter

Why should we export oil?
Because its a global market and theres a limit to what you can control within borders. By having an open market, efficiency is better and prices for consumers are lower. Longer term that market is efficient int erms of pricing an dencouraging new investment. You should continue to encourage investment and new development.

3) Timestamp 18 :30
Bret Kugelmass: tell me about the MIT energy initiatives

Joseph Hezir: began in the early 2000s by proff ernie moniz who served in clinton admin under sec of energy, was formally a professor at mit. Went back to mit to form this initiative. Its purpose was to elevate the focus across campus on energy issues. It did so in 2 main ways: it raised additional funding to bring in additional soiurces of funding frmo private sector and philanthropies for energy research on campus, it also was a center for doing energy policy studies. In 2007-2008 joe was doing consulting work for a large electric utility that had issues carbon capture from existing coal fired pp and they had technical, economic and policy conerns. Joe thought the inititative would be a good place to go to get some answers so they camr up with a joint prohext . director moniz then said to joe to come do consulting work for the mit project and he got involved frmo there. He wotked on the future of natural has study which was conducted in late 02000s because the unconverntial natural gas industry was about to take off and they wanted to know how that would change end use markets. He looked at natural gas use in industry and what the demand might be now that they had a much alrger domestic reseource. So far the demand has exceeded what they prediceted/

what s the source of the unconventionsl natural gas?
Some say its methane associated with the formation of the earth.on saturns moons there are oceans of methanethat arent frmo decayed plant matter. They knew there was gas trapped inshale rock and conventional drilling coulddnt cover that ina n economic wya. It was funded by doe in the 1970s to after the first oil embargo wehere doe embarked on it sfirst effort to assess all the domestic energy resources that we have. In the early 2000s the new horizontal drilling and fracking technologies, which were develped by the oil and gas industry, allowed us to recover enough resources economically.

Do tey extract more than they can use?
In some plaes theres no pipelne infrastructure, in others there have been wells drilled that got taken out of production because of the supply and demand.

4) Timestamp 24
Bret Kugelmass: what are the mandates for those plants to capture their carbon waste

Joseph Hezir: its in research, congress has jsut apprproutated some funding for this. Capturing co2 from NG plants is different than capturing CO2 from coal fired because the concentration is lower so it takes more effort to capture that carbon. The same tech can be used, it just needs to be modified. At EFI, this is something we work on.

MID SECTION BREAK HERE
What is the origin of EFI?

Joe was on the staff at the MIT program. Melanie keladine served as exec director and wehn ernie was asked to be sec of energy, he asked Joe and Melanie to go back to gov with him, because of them had prior governemnt experience. During moniz’s tenure at doe, melanie became director of energy policy and systems analysis and JOE became CFO. Afte the 2016 election, they decieded to forma n organiztion to continue the plicy work they were doing at DOE and this led to the formation of EFI as a nonprofit organzition, policy think tank focused on finding innovative policy solutions to move to a low carbon society. It was built on the foundation laid by the obama administration on the apris agreement. The 2 key focuese are decarbonization through innovatoion an strategies where technology innovations can lead to new soltuions to decarbonize the economy.

Do you advise on policy or do you do advocacy?
We dont do advocacy but we do research and advise on policies. They ahve 2 ground rules: they have complete control of what they work on (irregardless of what their funders want) and they make al of their findings public. They promote their work their website, presentations, webinars, seminar, speeches, congressional testimony, ect.

What technologies have you done research on?
For about a year they (with IHS market) studied, funded by Gates Ventures, the energy innovation landscape. They looked at current policies, current large players, resource capabilities, the infrastructure for innovation across the country and areas for breakthrough potential opportunities. It cameout this january and put together a framework to show how the gov and private sector should be identifying and prioritizing the technologies. There were about 20 tech areas that couldhave siginifcant impact in the market plce.

What were your top 3?
Advanced nuclear reactor technologies because its a large source of carbonf ree technolgoy. Carbon capture and sequestration, of twhich there are major demonstrations of rihgt now although the cost and texhnology need to be imprioved. They need to look at how much carbon we can safely sequester geologically. We also need to look at electrucuty storage. 4-6-8 horus of battery storage exists now but we need to eb able tos torage electricyty for days, weeks, months or even seasons (but it doesnt exist today).

5) Timestamp 34
Bret Kugelmass:
Wouldn't we increase the net global carbon footprint by requiring use of renewables?

Joseph Hezir: You ahve to look at the whole carbon lifecycle. In the case of battery technology, the big challenge long term is, if we expand the current use if battery technology we run into the risk of running out of materails such as cobalt and lithium. We need to look at less carbon dependent and more earth abundant battery materials.

Is anyone running calcualtions on the global scale of the material consumption needed if renewables were to take off on a global scale?

Most look at t a10-20 year projection int he US, western europe or china and not so much looking at whats happening in the rest of the qorld. Its very hard to look out 40-50 years ona global basis because there is a huge amount of uncertainy. One of our important themes is optionality, we may not follow the same path in the next 30 years which is why nwe need a robust innovation program to assess what will be improtant in the future for globaly energy developemt.

Is it possible that were too focused on innovation? Couldnt odler technolgies be cheaper?
Two other aspects to advanced nuc tech are 1) safety features, all new ones emboy forms of safety features. Even though the old plants are safe enough, active safety to passive safety may not actually add cost and its important to consider public perception. If were going to have a new generation of nuclear deployement we want to be able to say that its better. We also want to have a reused fuel system or a system where used fuel can be stored long term on site, older plants are built so that fuel is quickly moved off site and stored in long term storage.

Is there a big difference in cost in the advanced and old reactors?
Joe doesn’t think so. There’s an aspect of desiging to scale that makes a difference. Older reactors are larger and built customly on site. With advanced reactors, they can eb built on a smaller scale with many of their components being built in a factory. Just like in the technology field, we will hopefully be able to realize those economics of producing these technologies.

But what about the carbon cost of waiting 10 years to bring a carbon free technology to market?
The real trade off in the electricity markets is whether ur building new nuclear or anything other than nuclear. Without a carbon rpice, NG generation is very attractive because theres such a large domestic supply. Wind and solar benefit from a combination of state level mandates and the afct that they receive large federal tax incentives. Whether its a1970s LWR or an advanced reactor, theyre going to have trouble competing in the US.

6) Timestamp 45
Bret Kugelmass: why shouldnt we go to a different country to deploy nucelar where we dont face this proble,?

Joseph Hezir: theres interest in building an export market. Joe worked with the Atlantic COuncil ona report in whcih they showed there are countries that have the potential to do this but they arents as interested in byulding a 1000 MW plant than they do building a 2-3 MW plant. We need to get one step ahead of the game and thats where the advanced reactor game is important.

Isnt the big problem to remove the CO2 weve already emitted?

Even if you were to get to a net zeo carbon emissions in the next few decades, there would still be a certain amount of warming and climate imapcts that takes place. CO2 removal, via the air or oceans, is a new area that they are doing a major project study on to see what would be a R&D portfolio to advance CO2 removal. WIth carbon capture, ona small scale, this is being done although its not economic and needs innovation. Its important to be able to cature and isolate carbon in the oceans and finding ways to improve or capture the natural processes that soils and plants use to capture carbon. The next major report is on carbon dioxide removal because they see the need for a new fed gov initivate for R&D in this spce to provide more options on the table for politicians to deal with the climat echange issue.

Shouldnt this be the only thing that matters then?
Its not an either or propostition. We need to wrk on both mitigationa nd co2 removal. Implicit in your question is the problem that if u focus on co2 removal, then it doesnt matter what we admit in the atm and policymakers/the public wouldbt find that acceptable. They have to be complimentary solutions.

0:00 Finis Southworth’s Entrance to Nuclear
Finis Southworth is the Former Chief Technology Officer of Areva. He got his PhD from the University of Florida in 1974, and then went on to teach at the University of Urbana-Champaign and expand their fusion research program.

Finis hoped to make an impact in fusion but he eventually realized that fusion wouldn’t be a practical energy source for quite some time, so in 1977 he left academia to work at Florida Power and Light (FPL). At the time, FPL had two operating reactors and bought the Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Station (Turkey Point) as a turnkey plant. The fuel for Turkey Point was leased at a price of $1/barrel from Westinghouse which was predicated on a $6/lb Uranium price and a $38/swu enrichment price. The end to end fuel contract with Westinghouse meant that Westinghouse owned the fuel, controlled the core fuel management, and at the end of the fuel cycle after the spent fuel was kept in a pool for 5 years, they would take it off site for reprocessing. By the end of the contract they defaulted to the actual Uranium price and changed the contract so that Westinghouse didn’t take back the fuel for recycling (based on government trends and the fact that the West Valley Nuclear Waste Site was still at pilot scale).

The idea at the time was that fuel could be recycled and prefabricated into new fuel, but this fell to the wayside. In the end, the plants were responsible for managing their own fuel, which is what Finis was hired to determined. President Carter gave a speech in April 1978 in which he called for a halt on reprocessing, so almost immediately, various reprocessing facilities such as the Allied-General Nuclear Services plant, the West Valley Demonstration Project, and General Electric’s Morris Operation all stopped. At the same time, commercial enrichment was outlawed because President Carter viewed reprocessing as enrichment, and considered them proliferation technologies. The commercial nuclear industry wasn’t favorable to this response and Finis thought President Carter's speech might end the industry.

Overtime they came to see that this speech meant that the Department of Energy would enrich the fuel out of the Paducah Site and the commercial nuclear companies would negotiate market prices with them. Eventually around 1981, they were able to negotiate to take up to 25% enrichment from offshore sources. The cost of enrichment escalated up to $138/kg-swu, although it never was inexpensive because of the diffusion technology.

7:00 The History of Nuclear Fuel Prices
Part of the reason the prices were so high is because they hadn’t perfected centriufges at the time. Later on Urenko, and others, improved the design to be more efficient and lower cost per swu than diffusion. A “swu”, or separative work unit, is what it takes to move 1 kg of fluoride up to the next level of enrichment. With the LES facility in Texas and Areva’s Eagle Rock Facility in Idaho (which was designed and licensed) would have been 1⁄3 of the national use capacities. When Fukushima hit, the international market collapsed and 50 reactors went off overnight, so the LES and Eagle Rock Facilities were never built.

10:00 How Florida Power & Light successfully built Saint Lucie Unit 2 Post - Fukushima
At the time, FPL had just started up St. Lucie Unit 1 (which was finished in 1976 and later fixed in 1977). In October 1978, FPL began plans to build St. Lucie Unit 2. Although Three Mile Island occurred in March of 1979, St. Lucie 2 was built and went commercial by August 1983 (only 58 months after). After Three Mile Island, in the late 1970s and early 1980s, bond interest rates were 14-15% and inflation was 12-15%. So it was hard to borrow large amounts of capital needed to build new nuclear and slight delays were exaggerated.

All four ~900 MW new build units that FPL were working on were built in 60 months or less and were built on or ahead of schedule, regardless of Three Mile Island. Comanche Peak and a variety of other units that were getting built at the same time were getting delayed. St. Lucie 2 was license number was 50-104 and it was the 78th plant licensed. From the time it got it’s construction permit, it surpassed 25 other units. Over the next five years, there was a constant battle to convince the NRC to meet the schedule set for St. Lucie Unit 2. To do so, they sent FPL employees to permanently work near the NRC (in then Bethesda) to really push their plant permits forward.

Finis thinks a large part of this success was because of the FPL project manager, Bill Derrickson who had the authority and will to see the projects through. Bill reported directly to the Board of Directors (instead of going through the CEO) so that he could communicate the urgency of completing the build on time in order to prevent risk of FPL going bankrupt. Since this was a Bechtel and Westinghouse turnkey plant, Bechtel helped pushed the plant forward. Bill also froe the design a year in advance of the construction and only allowed optimizations on construction for the next year out. As can be seen from certain new builds by AREVA, Series and Westinghouse, fixed cost and fixed schedule never works. St. Lucie Unit 2 succeeded because they didn’t have an outsourced project manager, the construction project manager was from FPL themselves.

As CTO, Finis was focused just on the core. They didn't want load follow because it eats margins, you can have better fuel economy without it. St. Lucie Unit 1 was 14x14 fuel assembly. Finis argued to keep the assembly of St. Lucie Unit 2 the same, but in the end they went with a 16x16 (16 rods wide and 16 rods long) assembly. The 14x14 assembly has 176 potential fuel rod locations and the 16x16 has 236, which gives you more surface area for the same power in a 16x16 assembly, and your linear heat rate becomes 30% lower. However, they had a lot of rod bow in the 16x16 and had higher axial growth so this design ended up being less advantageous. They had to perform a three month outage to take out the fuel and inspect it. Together with EPRI, they put together their own axial rod growth model to measure every rod (using tools from Babcock and Wilcox). They validated the model and they never hit critical path before the outage was over so St. Lucie Unit 2 had a record first refueling.

30:00 Finis Southworth Joins Idaho National Labs
Finis became known as the change agent for FPL Nuclear. He traveled to Japan to benchmark plants such as Kansai Electric, people on his team were independent and capable, and his team was empowered to speak up. After FPL won the Deming Prize in 1989, Finis was put in charge of system planning and getting their capital expansion plans for the next 10 years in order and ready for the public utilities. They modeled the state of Florida, as FPL had ¾ of the state and did a determination of need. Finis spoke to their new CEO, James Broadhead to explain their ten billion dollar expansion plan for the 1990s, but it was clear that they FPL wasn’t going to build more nuclear until 2000 or 2005.

Finis then transitioned to Idaho National Labs where they were working on a new production reactor which produced large quantities of Tritium. Every few years you have to refurbish the amplifiers but without the K Reactor, they were running out of Tritium. To solve this, they designed a concept with gas reactors to make Tritium; in 3 years they developed 27 different radiation capsules and 3 major fuel qualification capsules. A capsule is a stainless steel encased rod with fuel elements that you put in a test reactor, irradiate and use to pull out the fuel. The advanced test reactor was built in 1967 and started off as a navy research reactor but now it has many uses. The difference between the test reactor and an operational reactor is that it doesn't allow neurons to move around, so you can use this to see if Tritium is leaking out of the reactor and if it can be recovered (it was capable of 99% recovery). They resolved a few problems in only 3 years and they beat (conceptually) the heavy water design.

35:00 The Plutonium Focus Area
The Rocky Flats Plant, a former plutonium fabrication plant, was shut down on the basis of environmental regulations violations. However, shutting down the plant led to worse environmental conditions and subsequently, Rocky Flats never started again. A similar event happened at the Savannah River and Hanford Sites because the waste is stored in tanks and not in final waste storage locations. Right after the Nuclear Posture Review in 1994, DOE started a project on handling the weapons residues. Hank Dalton reported to Charles Curtis and headed the project under the DNFSB recommendation 94-1. There was about 20 tons of waste around the complex to get rid of. Hank Dalton wanted all the labs to be working together as a single project to get rid of the waste at all these laboratory sites (Hanford, Oakridge, Los Alamos, ect). Finis was the manager and put together a team of experts to drive a complex wide plan, called the Plutonium Focus Area.

38:00 Finis Southworth Joins AREVA
Finis applied to AREVA and became the CTO after a year. He worked with gas reactors for a year, then on their expansion to the EPR (third generation pressurized water reactor) and other generation 3 reactors. In the US, there was a want for technologies that required R&D and more time. Finis helped orchestrate the R&D to make it on a more reliable basis. In terms of changing the fuel, the costs and timelines for doing so would be enormous. This is because changes in fuel assemblies take over 10 years to qualify and you have to do lead assembly tests, so it would take 15 years before the new fuel achieves market penetration.

52:00 Finis Southworth’s Outlook on Nuclear
Finis believes that we need to be building advanced reactors. If the US had 500-600 GW of nuclear energy, our carbon impact would virtually disappear. We need to be building prototypes of different types of new technologies (molten salt, sodium, gas reactor, ect…), prove 4-5 different concepts and get them out to market.