TITANS OF NUCLEAR

A career in the nuclear industry (0:16)
0:16-5:14 (James explains how he decided to focus his Master’s on nuclear engineering and his career at Dominion Energy.)

Q. How did you get started in the nuclear space?
A. As a child, James Miller originally wanted to be an astronomer or a paleontologist. James’ mother instead suggested he become an engineer, so he pursued an education in physics. The Vietnam War occurred during James’ Master’s, and so he joined the Navy as a communications technician. He then returned to graduate school and a friend convinced him to transfer to nuclear engineering. He then joined Dominion Energy, where he stayed until his return to academia as a professor at Virginia Commonwealth University.

James joined Dominion when they were first beginning their nuclear engineering program. At the time, Dominion had two operational reactors at Surrey in the UK. Two additional reactors were being built at North Anna, which James was able to tour when they were under construction. James worked on research and development, focusing on methods development for calculations for reactor physics.

Nuclear models and design (5:15)
5:15-14:38 (James explains the types of computer models he worked on at Dominion. He also discusses the difference between fuel design and core design and the importance of understanding the theory behind models.)

Q. What is the model?
A. The models James worked on were computer codes. In 1975, computers were much slower than today. The code calculated the distribution of power within the core and the criticality conditions. The codes were called PDQs, which stood for Pretty Damn Quick. IBM had developed their own version of the code, which Dominion bought and edited. At the time, many of the nuclear utilities were dependent on the vendors for design and defending designs with the Nuclear Regulatory Committee. Dominion decided that this process would be easier if this was all down in house to keep interests as a priority. It then took three years to develop the core design because the entire plant design had to be built in code, including all input and benchmark data.

James has worked in core design, safety analysis and fuel performance and design at Dominion. Fuel design looks at the performance of the fuel rods including material performance, corrosion, avoiding overpowering and avoiding exceeding burnup limit. The burnup limit is the amount of fuel that can be extracted, which is set by the nuclear regulator. Core design is how the fuel assembly is arranged inside the reactor core. The goals of core design involve avoiding violating safety limits and optimizing the amount of energy extracted.

James notes the importance of learning about nuclear theory because computer codes are not always correct. It is also key in recognizing when bad input data is producing bad output data. James points out that this can be an issue for the industry. Nuclear regulators were once gained industry experience before becoming regulators, but now, students become regulators right out of university. This lack of industry experience means regulators may not fully understand why decisions are made or why certain things happen.

Solving nuclear challenges (14:39)
14:39-20:40 (James discusses some of the challenges he faced when working at Dominion, including researching unexpected plant events, such as Three Mile Island.)

Q. What are some challenges that you solved at Dominion?
A. James primarily created new codes and methods. For instance, James looked at life extension of plants. Generation 2 plants were designed in the ‘60s and ‘70s and originally expected to operate for only 40 years. James also looked at unexpected events and the licensing requirements of design changes. Plants are designed with four different classes of accidents in mind. Condition Four are the major class of accidents, such as the large break loss of coolant accident, which has never occurred. Another Condition Four accident is the steam generator tube rupture where the boundary between the primary and secondary coolant is broken. After Three Mile Island (TMI), more trainings were implemented. This training not only provided operators with more knowledge, but also broke up the monotony of running plants. The Shift Technical Advisor position was also created after Three Mile Island to combat the ignorance of the operators that did not understand what was happening during a routine malfunction, ultimately causing the meltdown.

Three Mile Island and safety culture (20:41)
20:41-32:38 (James discusses the Three Mile Island meltdown and why the embedded safety culture has not replaced human operators with automated systems.)

Q. What would have happened at Three Mile Island if the operators had not touched anything?
A. The accident would still have occurred, but the plant design would have replaced the lost coolant using the safety injection pumps. The problem was that the operators did not know that they were losing coolant and were trying to avoid overpressuring the system. They unfortunately turned off the safety injection pumps, causing the meltdown.

James believes the reaction to increase human involvement in operations instead of replacing workers with automated systems is because computer codes do not always produce the correct answers. Safety systems can not predict every possible scenario. James does believe it is feasible to remove human operators in the new designs. The low pressure Generation 4 designs, such as the salt reactor, have passive solutions to prevent accidents in the case of a malfunction or breakage. However, the burden of proof is high. Historically, this conservatism for nuclear energy began with the military’s involvement. But this attitude was adopted by the industry at large and the regulator has failed to incorporate new knowledge and has changed very little.

Jame’s transition to university professor (32:39)
32:39-41:26 (James explains how he became a university professor and his role at Virginia Commonwealth University.)

Q. How did you become a teacher?
A. James always wanted to teach. University of Virginia and Virginia Tech used to have research reactors on campus and nuclear engineering programs. Both decommissioned their reactors and ended their programs when the nuclear market stalled, though Virginia Tech has since started again. Dominion wanted to have a closer pool of potential employees and approached Virginia Commonwealth University (VCU) to begin their nuclear engineering program again. James was brought in to teach reactor theory and manages the development of the nuclear reactor simulator, which is used as a teaching tool. After Three Mile Island, all commercial plants were required to have a simulator that exactly mimics their control room to train operators with. Jame’s simulator simulates a two loop pressurized water reactor (PWR) and can replicate reactor operations and simulate accidents.

PRAs versus FSARs (41:27)
41:27-48:43 (James explains how PRAs are the beginning of a change in safety culture. He also explains how the NRC’s requirements can impose a high cost to the industry with the example of FSAR.)

Q. Can anything be done to change the safety culture?
A. The industry is starting to move in that direction. The nuclear analysis department at Dominion now does Probabilistic Risk Assessments (PRA). If license holders can show with a PRA that some systems are not important in maintaining the core, then they can reduce the maintenance requirements and use cheaper materials. However, using this information to convince the regulators to change the culture is problematic. James sees this as a political and sociological problem rather than a technical problem. An example of this is nuclear waste, which is the fission products with no economic value. Waste is vitrified, meaning it is put in glass, preventing it from entering groundwater. Disposing of waste is not a technical issue but is a problem of perception. While there has been some improvement, a good example of the high cost of the regulator’s imposed safety culture occurred in the 1990s. The Nuclear Regulatory Committee (NRC) required the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) to be updated for every plant design change, creating an additional expense for operators. The NRC also required plants to identify all the “facts,” which they themselves did not define. Each FSAR is thousands of pages in length, requiring James and his teams to spend weeks identifying all important information.

The ruling that harmed the industry (48:44)
48:44-59:27 (James discusses how complex systems create more room for error. He also explains how regulation delays from the past and today are severely hurting the industry.)

Q. Sometimes safety for safety sake can make things less safe, right?
A. Many saw the additional retrofitting requirements that were introduced after Three Mile Island to be doing just this. Complexity can decrease safety because more systems create more opportunities for errors. Simulations help prepare operators because when an error does occur, the operators are familiar with what is happening. Often times, the system can take care of the problem itself by tripping the reactor, opening release valves and cutting off the fission reaction.

James believes creating larger reactors was a mistake. The Atomic Energy Commission (AEC)'s ruling on environmental impact in 1971 was a turning point. An Australian economist found that before the AEC’s ruling, the cost of building a reactor was decreasing. However, the ruling created new water quality standards and paused all construction for 18 months. The economist believes that if that hold was not put in place, the current costs would be 1/10th of what they are today. Fast forward and the industry is still facing delays. In 2018, the NRC approved two AP1000 operating licenses at Turkey Point, costing $35 million and nine years for the review. James questions how an industry can survive with such regulation constraints.

Math and Government (0:48)
(0:48-25:25) Michael explains how his background in math led him to a career in the
government.
Q. How did you come to the nuclear industry?
A. (0:48) Dr. Michael Binder is the Former Chief Executive Officer of the Canadian Nuclear
Safety Commission. He got his PhD in theoretical physics from the University of Alberta and
was on an academic track, but then got talked into joining the Defense Research Board. During
that time period -- the Vietnam War, the Warsaw Pact, etc. -- joining the military held little
appeal, but the Defense Research Board’s job was war games. Michael’s job to use a
simulation to figure out how many planes were needed in Europe to stop a Warsaw Pact attack.
He was recruited due to his mathematical models and methodology during his time at university.
From there he was recruited into a brand-new department called Urban Affairs trying to simulate
urbanization in Canada based on availability of jobs and workers. From there he transferred to
development government owned waterfront properties at Canada Mortgage and Housing.
Q. What were your roles?
A. (3:46) It was incremental, but Michael’s career slowly pushed him into government. He was
always on the science and innovation side of things, but he’s not a nuclear specialist. But he
has spent a lot of time trying to understand policy and regulation and learn how the government
functions. Eventually he spent 20 years at the Department of Communication (later known as
Industry Canada) where he was ‘Mr. Telecom.’
Q. This was when the telecom industry was going through a huge transformation.
A. (5:00) Michael was working at the Department of Communication during 1985, when cell
phones were released. It was a huge change that happened not that long ago. Then in 1989
email came out and the Internet became a reality in 1995 with www. Michael says they were
lucky because they were able to anticipate some of the revolution by meeting with leaders within
the rising technology industries.
Regulating Nuclear (25:26)
(25:26-38:08) Michael explains the regulatory review process as it applies to domestic projects
and international technologies approved abroad.
Q. If a new nuclear site were to open, how difficult would it be to get the environmental impact
assessment done?
A. (25:26) The Canadian government just came out with a new bill rewriting the environmental
assessment requirements. It’s hugely controversial, according to Michael. Some people think it
will be very difficult to achieve approval. But for Michael, the real struggle is going to be finding
community willing to house a nuclear site. He thinks rural communities should be the poster
child for Canadian nuclear technology, because remote areas burn a lot of diesel, which is
expenses and pollutes the environment and sometimes has to be flown in. But the community
has to agree.

Q. Instead of building at new locations, why not add smaller units next to bigger units?
A. (27:10) Bret says that every community that has nuclear loves nuclear. Michael agrees, but is
constantly left asking ‘where is their application? Send me your application.’
Q. Why are companies struggling to get through the vendor design review process?
A. (28:25) The design review application is separate from the license application process. The
license application will normally come from the utility company. But Michael thinks vendors are
not yet comfortable with the license application process.
Q. What are vendors so worried about during the application process? Why is it so expensive?
A. (29:28) Michael thinks most of them want a utility behind them for financial reasons. The
application is as fast as the applicant can deliver the materials to the Commission. The process
is not overly expensive. For the design review process, the Commission only charges for staff
time. Normally utilities and vendors would approach the regulator together.

Nuclear in China (38:09)
(38:09-45:00) Michael explains Chinese advancements in nuclear technology in comparison to
North American innovation.
Q. Do utilities in Canada invest in infrastructure project abroad?
A. (38:09) SNC-Lavalin sells CANDU reactors around the world, but they’re not a utility. But only
China, Russia, and Korea do this. However, the problem with building infrastructure in China is
that the Chinese government invites companies in, but in return ask to be educated on the
subject be that telecommunications or nuclear. Once China understand the product, they’re able
to export it around the world. Bret personally is okay with China taking over the nuclear industry
if it means the world would be saved from climate change, but he also believes the US or
Canada could instead export nuclear technology.
Q. Why isn’t the US or Canada more ambitious with exporting nuclear technology?
A. (42:13) The US and Canada are the countries in which innovation occurs, according to
Michael. To continue to foster that competition and innovation, the US and Canada need to sell
nuclear abroad, otherwise they become consumers of someone else’s products. Taking new,
innovative designs comes with higher risks but also higher rewards at market.
Public Perceptions of Nuclear (45:00)
(45:00-59:49) Michael describes public perceptions around nuclear and the difficulty in creating
new sites.
Q. Why is it so difficult to get politicians to support nuclear?
A. (45:00) Michael says they’re afraid of nuclear, built up by perceptions of war and mushroom
clouds. There is a lot of fear of nuclear in the public, even in Ontario, where the entire province
got rid of coal and nuclear power makes up more than 60% of the electricity.

Q. What do you think about safe levels of radiation?
A. (54:06) Some people believe that no amount of radiation, no matter how small, is safe. Bret
instead points out alternative idea some researchers are working on small levels of radiation are
good for you. However, for the last few decades the nuclear industry has been selling safety
equipment and radiation level protection services. The industry today does not sell nuclear
power plants, they sell radiation protection, according to Bret. The nuclear industry makes its
money off of selling fear; Bret thinks it effectively died in 1980.
Innovation in Nuclear (59:50)
(59:50-1:09:29) Michael speaks about his time as a regulator and why he stayed in the nuclear
field for so many years.
Q. How did you move from telecoms to nuclear regulation?
A. (1:03:00) Michael was tapped to help the Commission because of his regulatory background.
Instead of only staying six months, he stayed for years because he found nuclear fascinating to
be back in the hard sciences and technology. He says it was his goal to improve the regulatory
process that had included spending millions of dollars sending out print mailings and using
carbon copies. Michael says sometimes the nuclear community is allergic to innovation because
the nuclear technology is so vastly complicated and delicate. It is only more recently that
nuclear technology has started to migrate to digital over the originally preferred analog. This
caused huge international issues trying to upgrade 30 to 40-year-old technology, especially
since it was still working. Michael calls this complacency, ‘don’t fix what isn’t broken,’ a point
with which he disagrees.
Q. Do you think the nuclear can change its culture to become more innovative?
A. (1:07:52) Before Fukushima happened there were a lot of plans to build new nuclear plants.
Bret points out the 2008 Great Recession and economic crisis also played a role. Michael it
says it was a combination of the two factors that lead to a lack of new nuclear sites. Now, he
thinks that unless advanced small modular reactors take off, nuclear is dead. Nuclear today
needs to have a completely different structure and financing to succeed.
Safety Planning and Evacuations (1:09:30)
(1:09:30-1:19:08) Michael and Bret discuss the cases of Chernobyl and Fukushima as
compared to evacuation plans for Pickering in Ontario.
Q. Let’s talk about the ‘doomsday scenario. If Fukushima proved the worst thing that can
happen to a light water is no one dies, why is nuclear energy still considered so dangerous?
A. (1:09:39) Pickering, for example, is right in the middle of downtown Toronto. The doomsday
scenario there is different than at Fukushima. Bret argues that the off-site radiation from
Fukushima could probably not have hurt anyone outside of the fence. Michael says that was a
huge debate, but all safety plans for Pickering will involve evacuation zones of various sizes.
Q. Why was there so much debate?

A. (1:13:30) Bret argues that light water reactors cannot have the same disbursement affect that
happened at Chernobyl, so why is there so much debate over radiological hazards. Even at
Chernobyl, if we had known not to let children drink the local cow milks or given them iodine
pills, no one would have gotten hurt. However, Michael explains that at Fukushima, due to a
poorly designed nuclear reactor, problems persisted after the disaster. Regulators are very
concerned about plumes, which is where evacuation entered into the equation. Bret thinks
evacuations should be off the table because they kill people. According to him, a thousand
elderly people died due to the evacuation. Michael says that due to its location, Pickering has to
have an evacuation plan. For example, Pickering once evacuated because a truck of a train
came off the track and released fumes. The whole community had to evacuate because of an
abundance of precaution. In the future, plumes will probably disperse and there would be no
real serious injuries. Nevertheless, you evacuate. Michael says evacuation plans are set in
place to make sure that people are convinced that you did everything you could in a worst-case
scenario.

Introduction to Nuclear

(0:30-9:38) Ramzi discusses his start in the nuclear industry and early career.
Q. How did you get involved in the nuclear industry?
A. (0:30) Ramzi Jammal is the Executive Vice President and Chief Regulatory Operations
Officer at the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission. Ramzi was raised in a scientific family with
parents in the sciences and an uncle who was an engineering professor that worked on
containment for CANDU reactors long before the first one was ever built. At university he was
further exposed to some of the pioneers of the nuclear industry through his professors.
Q. Do you know anything about SLOWPOKE and why isn’t it the future of nuclear?
A. (1:46) Ramzi says it’s the safest nuclear research reactor in the world. The original concept
behind SLOWPOKE was to use it to generate energy for local neighborhoods of up to 1,000
homes. Ramzi says the nuclear field trended toward larger scale reactors. A lot of today’s
research is based on old research projects like SLOWPOKE.
Q. When you first got involved in nuclear, what was the public's perception of the industry?
A. (2:48) Ramzi got his start in nuclear during the climb to the height of the industry. He stayed
in the field through the plateau and decline. He experienced everything from the encouragement
of the field, to environmental impact assessments and effects on climate change, and safety of
the reactors. Ramzi explains that nuclear was part of the discussions about climate change
back in the 1970s. Nuclear was part of the mix along with solar power, wind power, and the
contribution of nuclear carbon free emission. Fifty years ago, the consensus was, if the
environment wasn’t taken care of there would be consequences.
Q. Why were people discussing nuclear as a steward of the environment in the 1970s, but today
isn’t not commonplace in conversations about climate change?
A. (4:33) As a regulator, Ramzi explains that globally, many governments have made policy
decisions to move away from nuclear. In Canada, every providence has its own energy profile
and program. Therefore, nuclear reactors are provincially owned. For example, in Ontario, up to
70% of production comes from nuclear power. He also points out that not many politicians have
publicly endorsed nuclear power within the last 20 years even though the technology is deemed
safe behind closed doors. Ramzi says there have been accidents in the industry, but we have
learned from them.
Nuclear Medical Technology
(9:39-21:42) Ramzi explains his past experiences with nuclear medical technology.
Q. What did you study and where did those studies take you?
A. (9:39) Ramzi studied the basic sciences and clinical work in nuclear medicine. He says
nuclear technology in the medical field is vital. For example, when he was fresh out of
university, the survival rate of children with Leukemia was three to five years. Now with
advancements made possible with nuclear technology, the current survival rate is phenomenal,
up to almost 90%. Nuclear medicine and radiation therapy are two examples of nuclear power in
the medical field.

Why is the risk debate such a large issue?
A. (13:58) Ramzi explains that science is inherently associated with risk, if it wasn’t then it
wouldn���t be science. Nuclear is no different. There is always an underlying risk of uncertainty
with respect to very low radiation exposure and at high levels it’s linear. At lower levels there is
always that spontaneous frequency versus what’s being triggered by an external event. An
external event could be radiation, could be non-radiation, and so forth.
Negative Perceptions About Nuclear
(21:43-32:35) Ramzi describes his domestic and international experiences with perceptions
about the nuclear industry.
Q. Does Canada have any programs to inspire young children to learn more about science and
nuclear?
A. (21:43) In school, Ramzi’s children were supposed to have a four-week section on nuclear,
but the professor decided to only do one week. He says educators have challenges presenting
nuclear education as separate from what happened during World War II at Nagasaki and
Hiroshima; that’s the wrong perception for today’s youth to have of nuclear. Ramzi’s own
children were labeled as ‘biased’ and pro-nuclear and regulation due to his work because they
chose to defend the science behind the nuclear industry. The sad reality is that science and
facts are often manipulated for peoples’ alternative viewpoints.
Q. You’ve done a lot of international work, including Fukushima.
A. (23:45) Ramzi took part as the President of the Convention on Nuclear Safety, to ensure
everyone was properly engaging in updated safety measures on an international level for a peer
review process by the Convention. The Convention is the only treaty recognized by the United
Nations that addresses nuclear safety. It was created post-Chernobyl to improve and enhance
nuclear safety globally. However, it’s an incentive-based treaty; there are no consequences
other than embarrassment if a country fails.
Q. Why can’t nuclear regulators promote safe nuclear?
A. (31:25) Ramzi explains that there is an entire industry built around promoting nuclear, as a
regulator his job is about safety; he doesn’t need to promote nuclear. As a regulator, he
promotes and educates the public that what is operating is safe and why it is safe. It doesn't
matter what the nuclear application is -- medical, industrial, or a power plant -- all the operations
always have to be safe.
Future of Nuclear
(32:36-42:35) Ramzi discusses recent changes to the nuclear field and his hopes for the future.
Q. How have things changed over the last few years?
A. (32:36) The Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission is a performance-based regulator,
meaning they can discuss designs with nuclear professionals that might lead to licensing. But
the Commission does not and never will force any developments.

Q. What has been brought to you that you’ve been really impressed by?
A. (40:45) The capabilities of the designer to demonstrate what they say is true is what has
impressed Ramzi the most. All technology has its challenges, but its designers are able to prove
the technology is passive and safe, it is a plus on the regulatory side. It is also important to
remember the environmental benefits. Ramzi has children and he doesn’t want their generation
to be burdened by the environmental impact or the inaction that’s currently taking place. He
believes in a mixed supply of energy -- wind, solar, nuclear -- to look after the environment.

University to Working in Nuclear Fuel (0:27)
(0:27-10:47) Peter describes his first job in the nuclear field.
Q. How did you first come to join the nuclear field?
A. (0:27) Peter is the Vice President and Chief Science Officer at the Canadian Nuclear Safety
Commission. Peter didn’t join the nuclear field entirely by accident. While at the University of
Toronto he took nuclear engineering courses. He then got a master’s degree in High Materials
Ceramics and learned that nuclear field is a high temperature ceramic. His first job out of
college was at Chuck River Laboratories. There he was able to use his background in physics
and material while dealing with higher temperature fuel behavior and fission power release.
Q. You were dealing mostly with ceramic uranium oxide?
A. (2:38) Peter looks into how these particles move and if they are soluble in the uranium. The
materials operate depending on the temperature of the fuel. In light water reactor fuel, the
centerline temperature is a little lower and the particles sit where they go. But in CANDU fuel,
the centerline fuel is slightly higher at 1,500-1,600 degrees, just enough for particles to migrate
out of the pellet and go into the gap between the pellet and the sheath.
Q. So atom sized bubbles find each other to great bigger ones? Or do they migrate out?
A. (4:47) Peter says they probably all migrate, similar to iodines. In CANDU fuels, because of
the changes and letting the particles back in, the fuel was developing a lot of small defects in
the sheath during operation. This was happening because some of the iodine was going into the
sheath causing stress cracking. The solution: a thin layer of carbon that acts as an iodine
scavenger. Because of fission in nuclear fuel, there are a lot of complex processes happening.
The actual composition of the fuel changes with time. The fuel starts with uranium oxide, but
with enough time you can produce plutonium and the fuel changes structure. Some of the fuel’s
behavior changes with time as well. Peter explains that the nuclear field is always working to
protect the public from iodines, that can affect thyroids. One of the most common safety
additions after Fukushima was to add passive metallic filters to catch iodines and cesium.
Safety First
(10:57-40:45) Peter explains methods of safety precautions at nuclear sites from a regulatory
perspective.
Q. Why are nuclear safety measures not more focused on metallic filters?
A. (10:57) From a nuclear safety perspective, Peter says there are three things that need to be
done in a nuclear reactor: 1) Control - make sure you’ve stopped the nuclear reaction in the
reactor; 2) Cool the reactor - if you don’t cool it, the entire core can melt down; 3) Containment -
keeping isotopes of iodine and cesium in mind. You always want to stop each process as early
as you can in failure. Peter explains that you want to build a robust system step by step, starting
from the beginning. Every barrier, no matter how well built, has deficiencies and in an accident,
it’s better to prepare and try to prevent as many different types of potential risks as possible.
Q. Why aren’t all reactors build underground?

A. (25:50) As a safety regulator, Peter doesn’t know what the business economics reason why
reactors aren’t built below-grade, but from a safety and security perspective it looks better.
Underground the reactor is harder to get at and removed from numerous human induced
external hazards. As a regulator, it’s important to look into design plans and point out areas for
improvement.
Q. What about issues you know you can’t possibly anticipate?
A. (30:00) Peter points out that even ‘unpredictable’ events often had circumstances leading up
to them that were predictable hazards. Such as was the case with Davis-Besse. The steam leak
leading to acid was predictable due to acid leaks all over the plant. That’s why external
processes such as regulation, and regular maintenance, are so important.
Nuclear Spent Fuel
(40:50-52:48) Peter explains nuclear waste issues and public perceptions in Canada.
Q. What’s the current state of nuclear waste in Canada?
A. (40:50) There has been scientific consensus for the last 20 to 30 years that a deep geological
repository is the solution to nuclear waste.
Q. Why doesn’t dilution work with nuclear waste?
A. (41:48) Peter explains that there’s an ongoing debate about nuclear waste, asking if it is
indeed ‘waste.’ Some countries believe that spent fuel isn’t necessarily waste. But Peter agrees
with the scientists that the best way to mimic nature is to isolate the waste for a very long time.
However, the difficulties with creating repositories are often due to failure to communicate with
the public that it is a scientifically sound solution and would be monitored.
Q. Can you describe why nuclear waste poses a hazard to human health?
A. (43:48) Cesium - a very mobile particle, has high energy gamma ray and can be harmful in
small doses - is the concern for the first 500 years. Peter believes you can never fully rely on
dilution as a safety method in the nuclear field.
Q. Here’s an example, people are worried about mercury in fish. But if we replace nuclear with
alternative power sources, it would lead to a fraction of the mercury found in the ocean.
A. (48:57) Peter says that even when most scientists agree on something, getting a public
consensus on that same topic is difficult, such as repositories. Peter thinks other, more extreme
measures of waste containment, would be nearly impossible to get the public to accept.

Safety and Security and the Future of Nuclear
(52:53-1:00:20) Peter offers suggestions for improvements on the regulatory side of nuclear and
his thoughts on the future of the industry.
Q. What do you think regulators could do to improve?

A. (52:53) Peter thinks that there needs to be a better connection between nuclear safety and
security. There are some schools of thought that safety and security are all part of the same
thing, or two sides of a coin. A security threat is inherently a safety issue and vice versa. For
example, a valve needs to be replaced - a safety issue. But the new valve arrives and comes
with WIFI. Right there you’ve got a security issue. You need to be thinking about all of these
pieces as part of a larger whole, not splitting into a safety team and a security team.
Q. Are there digital controls in Canada?
A. (55:48) The Canadian nuclear industry originally proposed a digital control during the 1989s,
when Darlington was being built. As time went on, the industry became more and more
comfortable with digital controllers. In places where there isn’t this long history of familiarity,
regulators have to ask themselves ‘is this a risk or is this just a risk I’m not familiar with.’ Peter
always explains to his staff that there’s always the risk of the new, you also need to compare it
to the risk of the current.
Q. What do you see in the future of nuclear?
A. (1:00:28) Peter thinks the big nuclear reactors will undergo life-extension projects. He’s not
sure new plants will be built. He thinks instead demands for power will cause an increase in coal
and natural gas until public pressure outweighs the demand.

From Uganda to Canada (0:10)
(0:10-5:13) Rumina Velshi introduces herself and her early years.
Q. Where are you originally from?
A. (00:40) Rumina Velshi is the President and Chief Executive Officer at the Canadian Nuclear
Safety Commission. She was born in Uganda to parents of Indian origin; her family moved to
Canada as refugees when she was 17.

Q. What was important to you as a 17-year-old moving to a new country?
A. (2:05) Rumina was brought up in the British school system, so her education was more easily
transferred to the Canadian education system. She arrived in Canada in February, and classes
start in September, so Rumina had to quickly decide what she was going to do both financially
and education wise. Her first step was to make sure she was taking high school classes that
would transfer to a university. When you’re a refugee, your education is really the only thing that

comes with you to a new place, not your material goods, according to Rumina. From a young
age Rumina learned the importance of achieving financial independence.
Q. What did you study at university?
A. (3:32) Rumina had always been good at math and physics but was unsure of what she
wanted to do for the rest of her life and her guidance counselors weren’t overly helpful in
steering her. But when Rumina read the course descriptions, the civil engineering course caught
her eye. The course had office work and field work, which interested Rumina.
Rumina Goes to University (5:14)
(5:14-7:45) Rumina discusses the importance of female role models in engineering.
Q. How did your role models inspire you?
(6:12) Rumina didn’t know of any engineering when she decided to go into engineering. She
chose to attend the University of Toronto and remembers her first engineering class having
three women in a class of over 100 students. It wasn’t until that first class that Rumina realized
engineering was not a popular field for other young women.
Q. Did you break the mold?
A. (7:15) Rumina was among the first women in the nuclear field on the operations side in
Ontario. She graduated in 1978 and joined Ontario Hydro, a public electric utility, during the
heyday of nuclear.

Private Industry to Regulatory Agency
(14:16-21:44) Rumina explains how she ended up on the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission
Q. What was your transition between the private industry and a regulatory agency?
A. (14:16) Rumina left the private industry in 2008, and a few years later was asked to serve on
the Commission Board as a tribunal member. After the left the private industry, she wasn’t able
to work for another company for a few years due to her contract but transitioning to the
regulatory side of things was allowed. She was the first Commission member who had
previously been in the industry.
Q. What is the Commission's responsibility to set regulations versus operations.
A. (17:19) Rumina describes the firewall between the Commission and the staff who work on
operations. The Commission does not have anything to do with staff outside of a public forum,
and all discussions happen in a public space. Staff acts as advisors to the Commission.
Q. How do you set policy?
A. (18:02) Staff members make presentations during public forums and Commissioners are able
to listen to different perspectives and ask questions of staff members. The goal is to maintain
the independence of the Commission.
Q. What are some situational highlights?

A. (19:40) Rumina joined the Commission shortly after Fukushima happened when emergency
management and readiness in regulatory framework were at the forefront of everyone’s minds.
During her first term as Commissioner, Rumina also experience a ‘whistleblower’ letter about
possible staff withholding information from the Commissioners. The letter and investigation were
discussed in a public forum.
Building Public Trust (21:45)
(21:45-??) Rumina describes how the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission builds trust with
the public.
Q. What are some strategies to gain public trust?
A. (21:45) Having public trust and strengthening that trust is among Rumina’s top three priorities
within the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission. One method to build that trust is through
transparency and making information readily available to the public online. The Commission
also provides raw data and results to members of the nuclear field who want to be able to
independently evaluate that information.
Q. Lack of knowledge or even negative opinions about nuclear are an opportunity to show
people how amazing nuclear is.
A. (30:18) Rumina’s role as a regulator isn’t to promote nuclear, but instead to make sure there
is factual information readily and easily available.
Q. What is the ultimate outcome when considering nuclear safety?
A. (33:35) Protecting the environment, public, and workers is the goal along with meeting
international security obligations to protect assets, according to Rumina. The Commission
doesn’t want to be a bottleneck that prevents innovation, but Rumina says they will never
compromise safety.
Q. How do you regulate all kinds of different types of projects and reactors?
A. (42:57) Canada recently passed legislation around environmental assessments called the
New Impact Assessment Act. To determine which project would go through a more extensive
review, there was a lot of discussion on the risk level threshold.
Nuclear, Women’s Empowerment, and Climate Change (44:00)
(44:00-49:42) Rumina discusses her hopes for the future of nuclear including involving more
women and using nuclear to fight climate change.
Q. What is the importance of STEM education for women?
A. (44:00) One of the reasons Rumina took her role on the Canadian Nuclear Safety
Commission was to be a part of a change in the industry. Her role gives her a platform to
achieve a lifelong objective to promote women in STEM fields, given her background as always
being among the first women in engineering or in the nuclear field. Over the years Rumina has
seen change, but a minimal amount at best. According to her, today’s nuclear industry is made
up of only 20-25% women, the majority of whom are in the more non-technical side of the

business. To appeal to the younger generation, Rumina says the nuclear industry needs to be
more diverse and welcoming to different perspectives. Having greater diversity and more
women on board is proven to be better for business. Rumina says it is important to not only
attract women to the field, but also empowering them to thrive and succeed. Retention is key.
Rumina also points out that empowering women does not mean dis-empowering men. Rather,
but supporting women the entire field will improve.
Q. What do you see as the future of nuclear?
A. (48:00) If nuclear is accepted as a viable option to fight climate change, Rumina sees growth
and opportunity. She believes the most exciting time for this industry is ahead of us. But as a
regulator she wants to make sure the field as agile enough to respond to crack downs or
expansion.

Studying crack formation (0:37)
0:37-4:52 (Leon explains how he first joined the nuclear industry. He also discusses his research focus as a PhD student.)

Q. How did you get into the nuclear space?
A. Leon Cizelj was first introduced to the nuclear industry as a Bachelor’s student in mechanical engineering when a professor took Leon to the nuclear research center to use the larger computer. He stayed in the nuclear industry despite the Chernobyl incident. Coming from a mechanical engineering background, Leon expected things to fail, so was not deterred from joining the industry after the accident. He takes a pragmatic approach, understanding that machines are not perfect.

Once in nuclear, Leon focused his PhD on finite element and the corrosion cracks in steam generators. Finite element is a way of modeling the structure of materials and predicting the formation of cracks. Steam generators in nuclear power plants are large vessels that contain two different separated liquids. Heat is transferred between the two without them ever coming into contact. The tube separating the liquids is about ¾ of an inch. While thin tubes allow for better heat transfer, they are more susceptible to cracking. Leon’s work focused on how to minimize this cracking. While other industries have similar systems for heat transfer between fluids, the nuclear industry’s perspective on failure and crack formation is much different from others.

Know How versus Know Why (4:53)
4:53-8:58 (Leon explains the nuclear culture and the difference between Know How and Know Why. He notes that nuclear safety culture can hinder learning.)

Q. How is an early engineer brought into the nuclear culture and mindset?
A. Leon believes young people simply follow the existing culture. Leon’s career is in nuclear research, allowing for more creativity than a commercial facility with many rules. This distance has enabled Leon to develop his Know How versus Know Why thesis. When we learn as young children, we first copy others. This gives us the Know How, such as following a recipe or operating a plant by following procedures. Know Why is important, though, because it gives us direction when we step away from procedures. Academia allows for experimentation, enabling people to learn from mistakes. But, the nuclear industry does not encourage learning from failure. Leon notes the safety culture aims to stop mistakes, preventing the industry from learning.

The European Nuclear Education Network (8:59)
8:59-14:15 (Leon discusses his current work and the European Nuclear Education Network.)

Q. How has your career in research and as a professor worked over the years?
A. Leon’s primary activity is running the research department. Leon also coordinates the institute’s technical support activities for the national regulator. Leon’s third role is teaching and supervising PhD students. In addition, Leon chairs the European Nuclear Education Network. The Network began in 2000 with 60 European nuclear universities. It focused on improving nuclear education to replace retiring nuclear professors and attract more students to nuclear programs. The European Nuclear Education Network enables European countries to share nuclear education ideas between states. The European Commission provides project funding. This is used to create new courses and for mobility funding, which enables students to take courses at different universities throughout Europe. While sharing facilities is great, it also means there are less nuclear research facilities throughout Europe overall.

Slovenia’s nuclear research (14:16)
14:16-18:41 (Leon explains the Jozef Stefan Institute’s research specialities. He also discusses blockers to extending Slovenia’s nuclear design research.)

Q. What is the Jozef Stefan Institute’s specialty?
A. This is a national lab created as a nuclear research facility 70 years ago. But, nuclear research only makes up about 10 percent of the Institute’s overall research today. Physics and biochemistry are the main research activities.

Because Slovenia has only 2 million people, Leon believes developing a new reactor in Slovenia would require a higher workforce than Slovenia has. However, Slovenia’s active participation in joint development projects would be a good idea in furthering Slovenia’s reactor research and development. While Slovenia could design a simple reactor without outside help, Slovenia need shareholders. Slovenia’s research funding is currently fixed and focused on supporting plant operations.

Rules versus Common Sense (18:42)
18:42-25:13 (Leon explains his Rules versus Common Sense ideology and the dangers of not understanding why rules are put in place.)

Q. Tell me about your Rules versus Common Sense ideology.
A. If one would like things to be safe, one would usually follow rules and procedures. However, rules only focus on what is known and do not outline what is unknown, which is only encountered when operators discover them. Most of the time, rules and education is sufficient. But, it is important to have someone on the team, such as a shift advisor in a nuclear power plant, who knows more about why a rule is in place in case the unknown is encountered.

Regulators run into the danger of placing too many rules. It may seem like a rule will make things safer, but new rules require more actions, which could ultimately negate the point of the rule. This presents a problem when a regulator is stuck on Know How rather than Know Why. If a smaller plant is lower risk because of its size and should logically not be subject to rules that apply to larger plants, a regulator that understands the Why of a rule should be able to understand why a large reactor rule may not apply to a small reactor. However, a regulator that does not Know Why and only Knows How may still require the small reactor to follow rules only applicable to large reactors. This can cause wasted money and time for the small reactor designers and operators, such as unnecessarily requiring 10 operators for a facility in which digital operation could suffice. It also offers the danger of falling outside of the assumptions when one only Knows How and not Why.

Achieving change with diversity and education (25:14)
25:14-33:38 (Leon discusses how mixing diverse nuclear professions could bring about change within the industry He also explains how education more members of the public can help increase societal support of nuclear.)

Q. How do you make sure change happens?
A. Keep it simple. Changing procedures is slow and one must first understand how to change procedures. Leon believes the easiest way to enact change is by mixing nuclear cultures. Regulators, operators, and academics each have different cultures. This is because they speak different languages and have different basic assumptions. For instance, the operators aim to keep machines in operation and safe. Professors, on the other hand, look at ways to destroy the machines to create solutions to weaknesses. While both aim to increase safety, the approach is opposite.

Leon aims to help academics, operators and regulators see that they all have a common goal. While diversity is great for the industry, nuclear has a difficult time embracing this diversity, which could lead to the industry’s defeat. The nuclear industry is close to having created a perfect, safe technology, but the public does not believe this. One way to approach this is to increase the number of knowledgeable people within society. Not everyone needs to be educated about nuclear, they just need to know somebody whom they trust who is knowledgeable. People tend to believe what their trusted friends say.

Reactor visits decrease fear (33:39)
33:39-38:05 (Leon explains how nuclear engineers can be ambassadors to nuclear safety by giving school children and journalists tours of the research reactor.)

Q. People may not believe nuclear engineers as ambassadors to nuclear safety, right?
A. People who enter the industry via academia are trained to Know Why prior to Know How. This created the opportunity to teach the public why nuclear is a great power source. The research institute in Slovenia allows visits from school children. Because Slovenia is so small, half of all school children visit the institute each year and 25 percent of these students are able to look into the core of the research reactor. This increases nuclear knowledge from a young age, decreasing fear. Leon has also hosted journalists at the reactor core to best educate them after Fukushima. Unfortunately, visitor centers have been shutting down due to cost. There is a pressure within the industry to push for faster, cheaper and better. The industry must think longer term, however, especially because nuclear reactors will be around for a long time.

Making nuclear as beautiful as Slovenia (38:06)
38:06-42:47 (Leon explains that although the desire to accelerate the industry is alive, the current careful culture of nuclear slows development. Leon also describes Slovenia and how he would like to see nuclear become beautiful again in the public’s eyes.)

Q. Can we think about reactors differently?
A. Yes. It requires the existence of waste management and reprocessing facilities. While we know how to deal with waste, society has yet to implement it. The desire to accelerate the industry by building rather than planning is there, but the current nuclear culture is too careful.

Leon lives close to his office in a village near the woods. While this allows him to walk in nature, he is also close to the airport and Ljubljana. Slovenia is taking environmental leadership and has the potential to become a frontrunner in technical innovation. Nuclear is the solution to our energy problems. For such a high density energy source, it produces very little waste. Leon wants to communicate these benefits to the public to make nuclear ‘beautiful’ again.

KIT explained (0:41)
0:41-5:56 (Walter explains what KIT is and how the Institute plans to restart a program to introduce school children to infrastructure to attract new engineering students.)

Q. Can you explain what the KIT is?
A. KIT is the Karlsruhe Institute of Technology in Germany and is the merger of the nuclear research center and the University of Karlsruhe. Walter Tromm is head of the Nuclear Safety Research program here, which covers all aspects of nuclear safety.

As an 18 year old student, Walter visited both a coal and nuclear power plant and noticed the difference in cleanliness between the two energy sources. Walter had planned to study mechanical engineering before the visit and decided to follow this path into the nuclear industry. Introducing students to infrastructure was a uniquely German thing but stopped in Germany about 10 to 15 years ago. Walter believes ending these programs is one of the reasons why Germany has a problem attracting engineers to universities. KIT hopes to start a program to introduce children to technology and physics with the aim of attracting students to the university to study technical areas.

Modeling severe accidents and core catchers (5:57)
5:57-10:46 (Walter describes his research career and the questions that still exist regarding molten core accidents.)

Q. What was your first job out of school?
A. Walter went on to pursue a Masters in severe accident research and a PhD focusing on core catchers. The research group used MELCOR code and other models to predict the interaction between the molten core when it leaves the reactor vessel and the surrounding concrete. There are still open questions regarding the effect of concrete destruction.

This research does not have to be purely theoretical and can be simulated in a controlled setting. An experiment in the US heated depleted uranium with a plasma torch to understand the molten core reaction and measured the released gas. This modeling is complicated and is still ongoing. One open question is determining the amount of time it takes for the 6 meter concrete basement to be eroded to the groundwater level. Another question is what direction the erosion moves in when the release spreads.

Blockers to adopting new methods and relaxing regulations (10:47)
10:47-20:46 (Walter explains how materials other than concrete can be used in containment. He also explains how some methods may be better than others, but adopting new measures relies on relaxing regulations.)

Q. Why can’t we use steel plates instead of concrete?
A. Decay is long term and steel can melt upon immediate contact with the molten core. A large ceramic layer could be used to release the heat to the containment. This heat, however, becomes another issue where the fission products could be released during an accident. Coming into contact with groundwater stops the core meltdown because it creates a glassy layer. The fission products are then released into the groundwater, but it takes a long time for the products to reach a river. Sand acts as a filter and groundwater level and flow direction vary throughout the year, creating somewhat stable conditions for fission products. It may therefore be better to allow the molten core to come into contact with a less stable basement layer and let it reach the groundwater to avoid pressure buildup.

Rather than stopping a meltdown, the goal is to stop the spread of source term. It can be argued that Defense in Depth may not be as necessary and core catcher decisions should be economical rather than one of public safety. Because of the filters in place, the release to the environment would be minor. However, adopting this approach is an issue of trust. Walter believes the 9/11 terrorist attacks which pushed for additional safety measures to be put in place to protect against the potential of an attack on a nuclear facility increase public concern over nuclear safety. Overall, there are always reasons to be found to generate a lack of trust in the ability for safety requirements to be relaxed. For Germany, the regulator is complicated. Each state has the power of regulation in addition to the head regulator, meaning regulations are not uniform and political power often dictates how relaxed a regulator is.

Germany’s nuclear industry and the need for education (20:47)
20:47-28:43 (Walter explains why German’s nuclear industry failed and how education can decrease radiation ignorance.)

Q. What happened to the nuclear industry in Germany?
A. Walter thinks the German nuclear industry made many mistakes. In the 1950’s and 60’s, the attitude from within the nuclear industry was one of arrogance and not one of inclusiveness or wide communication. People in Germany accepted nuclear as a clean alternative to coal and supported the building of facilities. However, Three Mile Island (TMI) and Chernobyl changed the public’s perception of nuclear and they felt as if the industry never communicated the dangers to the public. This caused the industry to become defensive, adopting more safety standards. The antinuclear movement strengthened this, making nuclear more expensive. Nuclear then become uneconomical. The industry failed to fight for nuclear power support and did not demonstrate the advantages to the public.

Additionally, Walter does not believe that we have a good enough knowledge of radiation exposure. A lack of radiation education on the industry’s side has lead to ignorance in politicians and researchers. Changing this requires the industry to educate people about how radiation exposure is natural as it occurs around the globe and in our bodies. Education must occur early and now and must be offensive rather than defensive.

Research at KIT (28:44)
28:44-33:01 (Walter discusses KIT’s research and his research interests.)

Q. What are some of the fields studied at KIT and what is some of the research that you produce?
A. KIT researches solar, batteries and nuclear. Specifically, KIT is researching nuclear waste disposal, decommissioning and reactor physics. In addition, KIT researches reactor safety and radiation. Walter studies reactor safety but is becoming more engaged with decommissioning. Walter wants to look into at reactor construction cycles and designing reactors with deconstruction in mind. Walter also sees the need for more robotic research to understand how robots could replace human activity in reactor facilities, such as using laser technology to remove aerosol contaminants from concrete.

Decommissioning and waste (33:02)
33:02-43:36 (Walter discusses decommissioning and Germany’s nuclear waste storage strategy.)

Q. Why decommission at all? Why not refurbish instead?
A. After a certain period of time, the concrete will begin to deconstruct, threatening the stability of a facility. It may also be more expensive to refurbish a facility than to decommission it and build a new one.

When dealing with waste, there is an argument to create long term storage to allow for future innovations to implement better waste management solutions. This is true in Germany, where the state is currently looking for an underground repository to store waste for at least a thousand years. This storage facility would not be permanently closed to allow for future generations to repurpose the waste with new innovations. It is forbidden in Europe to dilute nuclear waste in the ocean because waste is only diluted locally, not throughout the entire ocean. While dilution will not be a solution, Walter foresees Europe coming together for a European or regional repository. It is also important to remember that waste products can be used for other purposes, including fuel for fast reactors. This could create an incredibly long term energy source for at least 10,000 years.

The future of nuclear for Europe (43:37)
43:37-48:34 (Walter explains how the ending of Germany’s nuclear program may influence the future of nuclear in Europe.)

Q. What do you think could happen with nuclear in the future?
A. The last German reactor will be shut down in 2022, ending the nuclear discussion in Germany. The prospect of nuclear is still alive in Eastern Europe. Walter thinks other countries will look to Germany to see what will happen after ending a zero carbon electricity source. Walter foresees that if Germany’s transition away from nuclear is not a success, other European countries will learn from this and maintain their nuclear programs. Walter also believes small modular reactors may help create a balance between renewable and nuclear power.

Andrej’s journey from the Jozef Stefan Institute to the conference (0:27)
0:27-11:44 (Andrej explains his involvement with the conference and how he first became interested in the nuclear industry. He also discusses the Krško Nuclear Power Plant.)

Q. This conference is in Slovenia but it’s for all of Eastern Europe?
A. This in an international conference hosted in Slovenia which began in 1992. Andrej Stritar was the main founder of the Nuclear Society of Slovenia which was founded in 1991 after Slovenia became independent. Andrej remained the Society’s president for about 10 years. This conference is the main activity of the Society.

Andrej first became interested in nuclear at the time when the industry was creating a lot of excitement. As a student, Andrej was given the opportunity to work at the Jozef Stefan Institute, which is the premier nuclear research facility in Slovenia. The institute used to focus primarily on nuclear research, but nuclear has since become only a small focus of the Institute. As a student, Andrej was studying electrical engineering and control processes. He developed models to simulate nuclear power plants. Later, Andrej worked on thermohydraulic safety analysis of nuclear power plants.

The Krško Nuclear Power Plant was constructed in 1981 and Andrej first began work in 1977 when the plant was being constructed. Andrej’s role was to review the safety analysis reports and design documentations. There are several stories for the reasons behind why the American Westinghouse design was accepted for the Krško plant. The Yugoslavian president at the time was distancing Yugoslavia from Russia and was receiving strong pressure from Germany to construct a nuclear power plant. The president instead accepted an American offer to equalize the influence of other powers in the region. The financial offer from Westinghouse was also good. At the time, there was no nuclear regulatory body, so the nuclear power plant was constructed like any other industrial facility.

In 1984, Andrej left thermohydraulic safety analysis to join an International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA) fellowship where he worked in Brookhaven National Lab in Long Island. Here he worked on plant analysis for Boiling Water Reactors. After the fellowship, Andrej continued with this work. A few years later, Slovenia and Croatia began plans to construct a joint power plant which became the Krško facility. It was constructed as a joint project because the region used to be Yugoslavia. When Andrej first entered the industry, Yugoslavia planned to build 10 nuclear power plants, but this number reduced over time. The second plant project in 1986 collected tenders and Andrej was to review these tenders. But the project was dropped after Chernobyl. A Yugoslavian nuclear regulatory body was established in 1988 by a professor at the Institute and grew slowly and became independent in the early 1990s.

Slovenia’s Regulator (11:45)
11:45-17:50 (Andrej explains Slovenia’s regulator and how it differs from the US.)

Q. What functionally changed when the regulator became independent?
A. Not much changed for the nuclear power plants. The first plant began operation after receiving a license from the ministry. The authority then shifted from the ministry to the regulatory body, which later became part of the Ministry of the Environment. The regulator was established according to international standards and provided competent people to provide plant overviews. Unlike in the US, there are no resident inspectors because the plant is located only a short distance to the regulator. While the inspectors do fill out paperwork on violations, they are also trained to observe more generally. They focus on evaluating the overall safety culture of the plant, which Andrej believes is crucial.

The overreaction of 2008 (17:51)
17:51-30:28 (Andrej explains how nuclear events are discussed with the public. He gives the example of a pipe breakage that occurred in 2008.)

Q. What were some of the important things that occurred during that time?
A. No serious events occurred and the same director was in place for over 25 years, meaning the management of the power plant was good. In addition to equipment inspections, refueling and fuel purchasing, staff are required to always be prepared to quickly react to a serious event. For example, a large valve on the secondary site of the steam generator broke a few years ago. This challenged people to react quickly to fix the problem. The system is designed so that in the event of a failure, nothing should happen. While engineers understand that things break, the public does not like to hear this. Slovenia requires a statement to be issued to the public after a breakage.

On June 4th 2008, a small pipe broke causing a leak from the primary system to the containment. The system was slowly shut down and no serious event occurred. This was reported to the Atomic Energy Agency and to the Luxembourg nuclear coordination body for the European Union. Due to a confusion, this was reported as an alert rather than an informational report, which Luxembourg then distributed throughout Europe and to the European Commission. The event was then shared with the public as a nuclear accident and was distributed by major news outlets across Europe. Andrej was then interviewed by many news channels and had to deal with the overreaction. One positive that came of this incident, however, was the positive relationship established with Greenpeace after Andrej explained the incident in detail to an antinuclear Greenpeace employee.

Becoming Director of the Slovenian Nuclear Safety Administration (30:29)
30:29-33:18 (Andrej explains how he became the Director of the Slovenian Nuclear Safety Administration.)

Q. You were in the chief role at this point?
A. Andrej was the Director of the Slovenian Nuclear Safety Administration from 2002 until his retirement in Spring 2019. Andrej was selected because he was enthusiastic and helped establish an active nuclear society. He was also head of the nuclear training center at the Jozef Stefan Institute in 2001. At this time, the ministry published the draft of a new nuclear law. Andrej’s society prepared comments on proposed law. Andrej then organized the meeting of the representatives of the ministry to discuss the law. He was then invited to officially join the group that was preparing the nuclear law. This lead to Andrej’s selection to potentially replace the director of the regulatory body at the time. At first, Andrej did not want to take the position because he found it more comfortable to work in the nuclear training center. He finally agreed to take on the position because he likes a challenge.

Blockers to Slovenia’s nuclear future (33:19)
33:19-41:10 (Andrej discusses the challenges Slovenia faces when expanding their nuclear program. A safety of future underground reactors is also discussed.)

Q. Tell me about some of the challenges the Slovenian nuclear industry faces for moving forwards into the future.
A. Slovenia is considering a new plant again. It was first proposed about 12 years ago by the government at the time. The project slowed because politicians do not favor long term projects. Additionally, the US shifted away from nuclear to adopt fracking, contributing to a decreased interest in nuclear in Slovenia. A coal power plant was also constructed and the economic crisis reduced the availability of funds for new projects. Slovenia is also plagued by the problem of not being able to agree on projects.

Money does not determine whether or not a project is supported, but rather the impact on the environment. While nuclear power has a small infrastructure footprint, the core meltdown potential is a big deal. If the plant is placed underground, heat may not be able to be removed, which would melt the reactor and gaseous material would escape into the environment. While a river could be incorporated into the cooling system, the question arises as to what to do in drought or if an earthquake blocks river flow. Even with micro reactors, heat will need to be removed. Filters can slow the process, but the melting material would eventually enter the environment.

Establishing effective radiation communication (41:11)
41:11-46:40 (Andrej explains that establishing a strong safety culture is necessary in securing the future of nuclear. He believes this can be done through effective communication about the risks of nuclear radiation.)

Q. How do you think about the growth of the nuclear industry given the risk?
A. Proper management and safety culture ensures the future of the industry. Andrej believes that the risk of death during a meltdown is probably zero. This was seen in Fukushima where people were evacuated and no lives were lost. Andrej compares the risk of nuclear radiation to the risk of fire. The risk of a house catching on fire exists, yet we still live in buildings and have firefighters in place to deal with emergencies. Andrej hopes that society will reach a point where we treat radiation the same way as we treat fire. However, because we are unable to feel radiation, people are more afraid of nuclear risks. Additionally, explaining radiation to the public is complicated. The industry does not need to explain specific radiation terminology, such as beta, gamma and stochastic radiation. Instead, the industry should establish trust using popular influencers to enable the public to believe in the safety and benefits of nuclear power.

Identifying a nuclear influencer (46:41)
46:41-56:02 (Andrej discusses potential nuclear influencers in Slovenia and why a politician can not take on this role.)

Q. Are there influencers in Slovenia?
A. Yes. Firefighters are the most trusted in Slovenia. Small villages have firefighter clubs as the focal point of the village. The nuclear industry has engaged the firefighters but not in an organized way. Slovenia has yet to establish a main promoter of nuclear. This person should not be part of the nuclear industry, but should be trusted by the country. This person could be a former politician, a scientist or a respected entrepreneur. They must have no perceived bias and must be able to speak about Slovenia’s energy needs to the public. Slovenia, however, has a problem identifying the people who will decide the direction in which the country should move. For example, the Ministry of Infrastructure has been preparing plans for 15 years, but have yet to make a firm decision. While the Prime Minister has spoken in support of nuclear as a solution to climate change, he would not make a good influencer based on his political associations. Although he is supported, ministers have not spoken up in support of nuclear or made any decisions. Andrej takes on a realistic position and does not see Slovenia’s ability to develop and build a nuclear facility without the help of another country.

Andrej’s best case nuclear scenario (56:03)
56:03-59:27 (Andrej discusses his best case scenario for nuclear. He warns that if this does not occur, Slovenia would need to radically change lifestyles and decrease energy consumption.)

Q. If we were to look 10 years into the future, what would be the best case scenario for Slovenia, nuclear and climate change?
A. Andrej foresees Krško remaining in operation. He would also like to see a decision in parliament supporting nuclear and to see new constructed nuclear power plants. Andrej is not optimistic that this will occur, however, as environmental impact assessment, discussions with neighboring countries, and making a public tender for investment will delay construction. But, if nuclear were to be dropped entirely in Slovenia and renewables adopted in its place, lifestyles would have to radically change to decrease energy consumption.